

A
CRITICAL EXPOSITION
OF
WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY
OF
LANGUAGE GAME

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Dr. D. N. DWIVEDI, M. A., D. Phil.
HEAD
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD



By
(Mrs.) Tanooja Tiwari Nee Shukla
Research Scholar

Department of Philosophy
University of Allahabad
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PREFACE

PREFACE

Wittgenstein, Ludwig Joseph Johann was the first great philosopher of the twentieth century who for the first time in the history of Philosophy presented his thoughts about 'Language and Language-Games' - incorporated mainly in his two valuable major contributions published as the 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and the 'Philosophical Investigations' which projected the theories of two Wittgensteins - the earlier and later ones.

The 'Tractatus' is of course difficult sentence by sentence which requires careful study and can be understood by one having similar thoughts as truly viewed by Wittgenstein himself in the opening sentence of Preface to his 'Tractatus':

"Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it - or atleast similar thoughts. T.P.,3."

The 'Tractatus' is undoubtedly a modern classic of Philosophy. Wittgenstein himself believed that this work was a perfect solution to the problems of philosophy. The 'Tractatus' was responsible for the recognition of Wittgenstein as the greatest philosopher of his time. He was awarded the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy on the basis of the Tractatus-submitted as his thesis. It is strange

that a person, who was placed in such a high esteem due to the publication of his philosophy of language, would condemn his own views, later on, in his later work - The 'Investigations'.

Wittgenstein's theory of 'Logical Positivism' and 'Linguistic Philosophy' was interpreted by different philosophers in different ways.

The new approach is a new way of language. The old view of perfect scientific language describing the world is abandoned and language is seen as an indefinite set of social activities, each serving a different kind of purpose. Each of these distinct ways of using language is called a 'Language-Game'.

While studying as a postgraduate student of Philosophy, I was interested to study further about the theory developed by Wittgenstein in his later work - The 'Investigations'-which replaced, rather amended his earlier theory of language having been regarded as the perfect one. My keen interest encouraged me to undertake the 'Wittgenstein's Theory of Language Game', as my research project, discussed and inferred in this thesis with the study of 'Wittgenstein's theory of Language in Tractatus I and II' as the Chapters I & II with the 'Rejection of Earlier theory of Language' in Chapter III. The theories of 'Language Game' and 'Private Language' have been discussed in chapters IV & V

respectively with the comparison of the 'Tractatus' and the 'Investigations' with inferences and suggestions in the last chapter as 'Conclusion'.

The present work is based on the studies of the main Works of Wittgenstein and the commentaries of various philosophers which is submitted to the experts in the Philosophy for their opinion and appreciation, if any.

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Lastly and most importantly I express my deep regards and gratitude to my family members, especially, to my parents who were the great source of inspiration and encouragement to me throughout my studies as a student and research scholar, at all costs.

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Tanooja Tiwari
(Mrs.) Tanooja Tiwari Nee-Shukla
Research Scholar,
Philosophy Department,
University of Allahabad.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A	Analysis
BB	The Blue and Brown Books
BJPS	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
I	Inquiry
JP	Journal of Philosophy
M	Mind
P	Philosophy
PAS	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
PQ	The Philosophical Quarterly.
PR	The Philosophical Review.
PS	Philosophical Studies
PI	Philosophical Investigations.
PBA	Proceedings of British Academy.
PPR	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
NB	Note Books.
T	Tractatus.
TLP	Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
LLW	Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein.
WWK	Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis.
PB	Philosophical Bemerkungen.
PG	Philosophical Grammatik.
OC	On Certainty.
RLF	Remarks on Logical Form.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Wittgenstein, Ludwig Joseph Johann, one of the great philosophers of the 20th Century was born in 1889 in an Austrian family of Jewish descent in Vienna. He studied Engineering at Berlin and then at Manchester as research student of engineering. The mathematical aspect of his study led him to develop an interest in pure mathematics and philosophy of mathematics which brought him in the close contact of Russell and Frege at Cambridge where he studied as a student of Russell and soon became his friend and colleague. He served in the Austrian army in the First World War, and was captured in Italy at the end. By this time, he had completed his *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* which was published in Germany in 1921 and in London 1922. At that time, he believed that his work was a perfect solution to the problems of philosophy. On his release after the war, he returned Austria and remained away from the field of philosophy nearly for a decade; and on the advice of Ramsey and others he returned permanently to Cambridge and philosophy. First three to four years he was critical of his own earlier views which are notes of lectures dictated to his pupils. He succeeded G.E. Moore and became Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge in 1939. But on the outbreak of Second World War he worked as a porter in a London hospital.

In 1947, he resigned from the Professorship in order to devote himself entirely to research; but his health deteriorated soon and he died of cancer in 1951.

Wittgenstein's work was divided mainly into two parts, his earlier views are contained in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. His later views were in his 'Blue and Brown Books' which were published as 'The Philosophical Investigations' which contain his thoughts regularly revised from mid thirties until his death.

Wittgenstein's First work - The '*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*' is undoubtedly a modern classic of Philosophy which is very difficult work written in aphoristic style though it can be read in a very short time, but it is very difficult to understand it even after several readings. It requires careful and attentive study. The '*Tractatus*' presents its theories in many ways similar to Russell's Logical Atomism. Though very frequently Wittgenstein differed from Russell on important points and adopted much more extreme and consistent empiricism. He first states a metaphysics according to which the world consist of simple facts which are not dependent to any other. Ultimately these facts were the subject matter of empirical signs. Wittgenstein gives no examples of what he regarded as simple or elementary facts. He held in the '*Tractatus*' the language as a vehicle thought, has as its

purpose the starting of facts, which he does by picturing the facts; by saying that language pictures fact. He wanted to claim that a language must have a structural similarity to what it describes. He says that an informative statement will be a picture of some possible state of affairs in the same way as a sketch map can picture a battle or the arrangement of the furniture in a room. A perfect language is imaginable and is in principle constructable in which for example, the spatial relationship of objects will be pictured clearly by the spatial relationship of their names. Thus, the significant use of language is to picture facts and beyond this there is a derivation. Beyond the fully meaningful picture of fact and the legitimate but empty tautology there is no legitimate use of language and any attempt to use it otherwise will be non-sensical particularly, in all ethical and metaphysical utterances. Since they are neither empirical nor tautologies, all such utterances will be non-sensical violations of the proper use of language.

As consistency requires Wittgenstein announces his own metaphysics and theory of language in the Tractatus as meaningless nonsense. He says that tendency to talk nonsense is caused by the complicated and untidy character of ordinary language. Wittgenstein devotes a great deal of attention to the technical problem of constructing an ideal

language which gives no scope for nonsense. Wittgenstein's later philosophy is aimed to show why the whole method of thinking adopted in the Tractatus is mistaken, though, it also tends to destroy all traditional approaches to Philosophy. The basis of the new approach is a new view of language. The old view of Tractatus, that there is in principle the one perfect scientific language with the sole task of describing the world, is abandoned and language is seen as an indefinite set of social activities, each serving a different kind of purpose. Each of these distinct way of using language is called a Language-Game by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein remarks in Philosophical Investigations: it is interesting to compare the multiplicity of tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of words and sentences with what logicians have said about the structure of language including the author of the 'Tractatus, Logico-Philosophicus'.

CHAPTER - I

WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE IN TRACTATUS-I

Wittgenstein's Theory of Language Games has given an entirely new perspective in Philosophy. It elucidates the notions of meaning, truth and understanding etc. in a way which is completely different from the earlier theories. But a proper understanding of his theory of language-games presupposes an adequate discussion of his earlier views. He himself maintains that his new ideas can be understood against the background of his earlier views. Hence our study begins with a critical discussion of the theories of the 'Tractatus'.

The text of the 'Tractatus' is very short but very difficult which can be read over in a very short time; but it can not be understood thoroughly even after many readings. It has the difficulty of it's style and thought which requires careful and attentive study. The difficulty faced in the style is that it's paragraphs are short, crisp and compressed, as such, though interesting, are very difficult to be grasped. The expressions have not been put up systematically in sequence which causes difficulty before the reader in correlating the subject matter. Thus, one develops the impressions contrary to the effectivity of its contents; but the reader can make out the correct relationships from it's contents scattered in different

numbers of paragraphs, provided he takes keen interest in careful and attentive study of the contents in full.

The second difficulty of style lies in the presentation of his arguments by Wittgenstein who does not state clearly the processes and arguments lying behind his thesis; and states the conclusions only. Max Black has rightly remarked:

"Of strict arguments there is very little in the book...but his main arguments are presented dogmatically".¹

This does not mean that he was a dictatorial metaphysician. It can be traced from the notes of Russell and Moore and from other reports that his views and utterances incorporated in 'Tractatus' were very strong and forceful.

The third difficulty is related to the contents of the 'Tractatus' wherein the words like 'world', fact, sense, tautology etc. have been used in such particular senses that even the experts are unable to understand them in proper perspective. He was gifted to solve the problems raised by other important thinkers like that of Russell & Moore. He could easily solve difficulties whereas others had taken it for ever. He raises new questions and new points about the field of facts like Moore. In the Preface to 'Tractatus', he says:

"The book perhaps only be understood by those who

have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it or similar thoughts".²

The aforesaid reasons were responsible for the 'Tractatus' being misunderstood in a large scale. According to Wittgenstein that even the experts of investigation like Russell, Frege, Moore and Ramsey misunderstood it. The thinkers of other group i.e. Weinsberg, Haris, Mure, Blanshard and positivist like Schlick, Popper, Maslow etc as well termed it a treatise based on Logical Positivism.

Though Wittgenstein's 'Investigations' rejected 'Tractatus' and described it as superstition, even then the study of 'Tractatus' is important from the angles detailed below:

1. There are philosophers like stenius, Seller etc. who claim that certain theories incorporated in 'Tractatus' are even now correct.

2. The 'Tractatus' encouraged the expansion of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism which can be understood only with the careful study of the 'Tractatus'. Thus, it finds very important place in the history of twentieth century philosophy.

3. The later theories of Wittgenstein can be understood with the thorough study of the Tractatus according to him who says in the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations:

"Four years ago I had occasion to reread my first

book (The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain it's ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking."³

4. Wittgenstein never held the inference that the 'Tractatus' was entirely wrong. It is wrong to say that earlier Wittgenstein was of the view⁴ of the ideal language, and the later Wittgenstein was concerned with the ordinary language. It was most unfortunate that he himself assumed in his later volume-'Philosophical Investigations' that 'language functions in way by picturing facts,' and termed his earlier view as 'Superstition. He accepted the logical validity of ordinary language even in the 'Tractatus' though he was confused about it's functions, which⁵ was improved upon by him in his later findings. Therefore, it can not be claimed that the 'Tractatus' was wrong in full.

While starting with the problems raised by Russell and Frege regarding mathematical logic Wittgenstein's attention was drawn to the functioning of the descriptive languages which enabled him to develop the idea of adequate symbolism and technical views regarding logic and language. He simultaneously concentrated on thought or language to reality which gave birth to 'Linguistic Turn in contemporary

philosophy.

Wittgenstein's conception of language and his search for research of language is closely related to the structure of the World and his conception about the World is determined by his views about language. The requirements of a significant language are the names and propositions. He maintains in the 'Tractatus' that names have no meaning unless used in a proposition. He says:

"Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning".(T.3.3).

Wittgenstein held that primary unit of a language is a proposition and not name. For Wittgenstein the totality of significant language is thought or language. He writes:

"The thought is the significant proposition" T.4.

"The totality of propositions is the language" T.4.001.

"A proposition is simply the description of a fact". T.3.023(3).

"To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true". T.4.024(1).

"A proposition presents the existence and non-existence of atomic facts". T.4.1.

Thus, it is clear from the above views that only propositions can convey sense and the sense of a proposition is the state of affairs denoted by it which means that the

state of affairs is the essential requirement of a significant language; and in the absence of which the language can not convey any sense. Similarly there must be actual states of affairs i.e. facts for propositions being true. According to Wittgenstein atomic facts are necessary for the sense and truth of language. Thus it can be said that the World is totality of facts and not of things which led him to divide the World into facts instead of things a new vision of the World based on Wittgenstein's logical investigations.

The use of 'fact' is to emphasise certain assertions eg. 'It is a fact that bears exist'. The term 'fact' is used as a linguistic device and does not denote any objective reality. In the opinion of Wittgenstein 'fact' is something extra-linguistic which makes linguistic propositions true.

Wittgenstein believes in his own apriori analysis of language. He thinks a significant language consists of atomic facts and objects. Atomic fact is the unit fact the primary constituent of the World. A language does not consist of mere names. Names must be combined in elementary propositions which are the logical pictures of states of affairs. According to Wittgenstein all propositions are analyzable into elementary propositions; and all propositions must be truth-functions of elementary propositions.

An elementary proposition consists of only names as held by Wittgenstein. Accordingly, the difficulty arises to the effect that how can an elementary proposition say or state anything. Merely the list of names cannot state about a fact and therefore they cannot be either true or false like that of propositions. The another peculiar feature of language is correlated with propositions wherein a person, without having gained previous knowledge about the sense, understands a proposition meant for. For example, none has the previous knowledge of this proposition: "There are now 14 young apes playing with an African anteater on my living room floor'. But the persons who know English can understand the meaning of aforesaid proposition provided they know the meanings of the connected words. The past familiarity of words can convey a new sense which may be like a trivial fact which is certainly not so. It is because of our past experience of meeting examples daily. This is a very important fact which requires explanation. Whenever a new combination of words is spoken forming a new proposition, we understand what does it mean without somebody's, previous guidance or knowledge about it. But it is fact that without having been told the meaning of the names of the facts, we cannot understand their meanings. Therefore, we can say that propositions are not names of the fact they describe.

This peculiar feature of language is of the great

importance so far its usefulness and flexibility are concerned. If each sentence of a language has its own special meaning which cannot be derived from its constituent words, the language and we both would have limited scope. Then there would be a list of things like vocabulary of words in the language which can be used by a person whenever he wants to say some standard things. The following example of aforesaid language will make it clear that unless one is conveyed the idea behind a particular statement, he can not clearly tell what do they denote, e.g. certain flags mean certain things a blue flag denotes "It is raining in the mountains", a red flag denotes, "It is raining on the beach", a brown flag "There is snow on the mountains" and so on. Thus, it is clear that it would be impossible at a stage when one may not remember all such sentences denoting certain events whereas in our language it is a common event.

This feature of our language finds importance from Wittgenstein himself who says:

"It belongs to the sense of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us".(T4.027). Like elsewhere, Wittgenstein seems to be confused about proposition with propositional sign because a sentence communicating a sense to the reader is a propositional sign and not the proposition. Having new senses propositions can not be claimed to communicate them. Thus, it can be rightly

argued that here Wittgenstein has gone too far because there may be a language (like the flag language discussed above) in which propositional signs cannot communicate new senses immediately. Simultaneously it can be argued, in favour of Wittgenstein, that unless it has a syntax combined elements it can not form a language unless with a syntax.

By the use of old words we may express new propositions through our language which the hearers can often understand the new sense without previous knowledge and guidance. Wittgenstein explains this vital and puzzling feature of language:

"A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me".(T4.021).

This is an absolutely true solution to the problem because a picture has the same features which a proposition has because it represents some situation which can be understood simply by looking at the picture, without previous explanation about its depiction.

Pictures represent definite situations whereas a proposition does not. But Wittgenstein does not say that a proposition is an ordinary picture of the situation it describes, rather it is a "logical picture" of it. (T4.03[3]).

In order for one thing to be a logical picture of another thing there must be three conditions:

1. Correspondence between the component of both the things.
2. Correspondence between every feature of the structures of both the things.
3. Rules of projection connecting the component of both the things.

A good example regarding above is the rules connecting a musical score and an actual performance of it; given either the score or the performance, the other can be reconstructed from it. Wittgenstein uses this example as follows:

"There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such an entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is a rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records." T4.0141.

While discussing the picture theory, Wittgenstein refers to certain doctrines of Hertz's Principles of

Mechanics through which the first vague suggestion of the aforesaid idea was born in his mind:

T4.04 "In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation it represents. The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity."

Wittgenstein's view of the proposition is that it is a model of the situation represented by it than to say it is a picture of it which seems to be more proper. Wittgenstein often uses the term 'model' in this connection: T4.01[2] "A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it."

The contents of (T.4.031[1]) also suggest the similarity of a model: (T4.031[1]). "In a proposition a situation is, as it were, constructed by way of experiment."

According to Wittgenstein's position it can be said that the proposition is a projection of the situation it describes. Though Wittgenstein also uses that word as the propositional sign for the projection of the situation:

"We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written etc.) as a projection of a possible situation". T3.11(1).

Since one knows the general rules of projection of language he can understand a new proposition without its sense being explained to him like a musician who knows the

general rules of projection of music and can read a new score without previous explanation.

The preliminary objections, raised against Wittgenstein's picture theory of propositions, are washed away by his insistence that propositions as ordinarily expressed are not, in that form, pictures of the situations they describe. (T4.011). It is correct that only elementary propositions consisting of names are pictures of situations. But when other true functions of elementary proposition analysed from other kind of propositions are fully exposed, it also is a picture of situation it describes; and even the non-elementary proposition represents something only when component elementary propositions do so.

"First and foremost the elementary propositional form must portray; all portrayal takes place through it.[NB.entry for 31.10.14]".

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Wittgenstein says that since a proposition is a picture of the situation, it describes, this must hold of it too (T.4.04[1]). But only elementary propositions can meet this requirement because they alone entirely consist entirely of names each of which denotes an object directly.

According to Wittgenstein in T4.0311, "One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group like a tableau vivant presents a state of affairs."

But a problem still remains unsolved that when an elementary proposition is a series of names, how can it state a fact or how can it say anything true or false? Wittgenstein answers this question by saying:

"What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way". T2.14.

A picture is a fact." T2.141.

A dispute arises between Wittgenstein's view and common sense connected with the earlier, whether the world divides into facts or into objects. It is a common-sense that in a picture things represented are nothing but patches of paint or ink which represent the objects of the scene depicted. Wittgenstein disagrees with this way of describing the matter. He maintains that what represents the scene is certain facts as he says in T2.15(1): "The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same ways."

Therefore, a picture is a fact which represents certain feature of the reality. The slight difference in depiction of the objects seems to be structural feature of reality. The non-structural features are represented by patches of paint. Wittgenstein say so: "In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them".T2.13.

"In a picture the elements of the picture are the representative of the objects". T.2.131.

The elementary propositions are list of names as they seem to be at the first look. But Wittgenstein does not say that an elementary proposition is list of names. He says it is a "nexus" a concatenation of names". (T4.22). He had made his view clear in T3.141(1): "A proposition is not a medley of words (just as a theme in music is not a medley of notes.)".

A propositional sign like a picture is a fact as stated by Wittgenstein in T3.14 as follows:

"What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another. A propositional sign is a fact".

Wittgenstein asserts, as stated in T3.142, that a propositional sign can represent something* describing a state of affairs. He says:

T3.142: " Only facts can express a sense, a set of names can not".

Wittgenstein repeatedly denies as stated above that a list of names can possibly say anything.

To make the distinction between the propositional sign and the propositions, Wittgenstein makes use of the expressions 'sign' and 'symbol'. A propositional sign is formed by signs whereas a proposition is formed of symbols.

Wittgenstein has expressed T3.31(1): "I call any part of a proposition that characterises its sense an expression (or a symbol)".

"Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it". T3.318.

A symbol is a sign having its relation to the object it denotes an element of reality. Therefore, an elementary proposition consists of elementary symbols which are names. So an elementary proposition consists of names (T4.22), whereas an elementary propositional sign (sentence) consists of elementary signs (words) T3.14.

Wittgenstein says in T3.32: "A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol".

Symbol is actually not visible whereas sign is visible. But what sign denotes that makes it a symbol though it is not visible. The essential part of its being a symbol is its relation to its objects which we can't see. Wittgenstein says so in T3.321:

"So one and the same sign (written or spoken etc.) can be common to true symbols in which case they will signify in different ways." T3.321.

In an example, the sign 'school' can be meant a mountain or an institution for imparting education. A picture representing this view is a 'symbol' and marks of paint are 'sign'. "What can be perceived of (the picture)".

Regarding above an objection may be raised that Wittgenstein had the reason for supporting his view that a proposition is a picture of a situation and the reason is that a person can see the proposition describing a situation just by looking at it. Here, he says that a proposition is a complex symbol and whatever we can see of a symbol is a sign. It is perfectly correct that whatever we see of a proposition is either a sentence or a propositional sign. In case looking at it is not possible how can we understand the situation a proposition denotes just by looking at it.

There is no doubt that we can see only the propositional sign or not the proposition. But the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world as said by Wittgenstein in T3.12. Thus, like a person having a knowledge of the rule of projection for music, we can, with the knowledge of the rules of projection for language, tell easily as to which situation is being described by proposition.

Wittgenstein even now maintains that a proposition conveys something just because it is a picture. He says so in T4.03(4): "A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture".

This view gives birth to a new difficulty that a proposition, indeed, says something but the picture does not. Then how can a proposition say something just as a

picture. Since a proposition says something it can not be a picture whereas a picture does not. Of course, a picture can be used to convey something but it can not do so if it is unlike a proposition.

Wittgenstein claims that propositions, which say something are pictures whereas our view about the ordinary picture is that they do not say anything. Thus, we find that there is not much difference between the two. Therefore, the following two views of Wittgenstein are perfectly compatible to each other:

- (a) A proposition is a picture of a situation, and
- (b) A proposition states, or says, something.

Besides, defending the compatibility of (a) and (b) as above, he claims that (b) is true only because (a) is true. He says: "A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture" (T4.03[4]).

In T4.03(4) as aforesaid, the emphasis is on the 'something' rather than on the 'states' which might be read "A proposition states something definite only in so far as it is a picture".

Wittgenstein thinks that a proposition has a content, says something definite only by being a picture because he thinks that a proposition can describe beyond itself and can describe a definite situation by being it's picture. This view lying behind T4.03(4) is evident from his two

statements given in preceding paragraphs quoted below:

"A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with situation". T4.032.

"And the connection is precisely that it is it's logical picture". T4.03(3).

Since the 'flags', without being pictures, point beyond themselves and communicate a situation to us, so the extreme claim of Wittgenstein envisaged in T4.03(4) can not be treated as authoritative.

Wittgenstein has firm belief that a proposition is a reality. Therefore, whatever is possible to say is that certain picturable situations either exist or do not exist. If it is impossible to picturise a particular situation, it can not be authoritatively said that the particular situation either exists or does not exist because no conceivable proposition can say any thing about it. It can be derived from the above stated both the views that all the propositions must be truth - functions of elementary propositions. According to picture theory of propositions the elementary propositions are logical pictures of states of affairs. Therefore, what is asserted by the original proposition, must be assertable by a group of logical pictures of states of affairs. According to Wittgenstein the picture theory of propositions demands that since an elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself as

stated in T5(2) that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.

Wittgenstein supports the above view with the arguments based on the premises that elementary propositions are pictures of reality and all propositions can be analysed into elementary propositions. He comes to the conclusion that all propositions are truth - functions of elementary propositions. According to Pitcher's view: "The argument can look plausible because the conclusion derived from those premises seen inevitable but he thinks the argument is not valid in fact."⁴ He further says illustrating an example that the argument may be plausible to suppose that if you are given as materials to construct molecular propositions nothing but pictures, namely the elementary proposition, the only operation that you could possibly perform on them would be the truth-functional ones described above which may appear to be the "natural" ones. But they appear to be the sole natural ones only if a certain kind of analogy guides our thinking about the matter.

In Wittgenstein's view, none of the logical constants denote anything (T.4.0312[2]). Therefore, even if the Wittgenstein's view is accepted to the effect that elementary propositions are pictures of the states of affairs they describe and that all propositions can be analysed into elementary propositions, in no ways it follows

that all propositions must be truth-functions of those elementary propositions, according to his expectations because there is no surety that all propositions can be so made as there may be such functions which are not reducible to truth-functional ones.

Without the involvement of picture theory of propositions, there is another view which may have helped Wittgenstein to the thought that all propositions must be truth-functions of elementary ones. If agreed to that there are elementary propositions which assert the existence of states of affairs, then it would have been correct to think that if one had all the elementary propositions with the knowledge as to which were true and which were false, he would have known all about them. This point can be illustrated with the example given below:

Suppose there are only three possible states of affairs which are described by the elementary propositions p , q , & r , respectively. Then the actual world must be one of eight possible worlds - one of those described by the propositions: $p.q.r$; $\sim p.q.r$; $p.\sim q.r$; $p.q.\sim r$; $p.\sim q.\sim r$; $\sim p.\sim q.r$; $\sim p.q.\sim r$; $\sim \sim p.\sim q.\sim r$. If there are only three possible states of affairs then there are four possibilities: either all three exist, or only one of the three exists, or only two of the three exist, or none of the three exist. Since all the possibilities are represented by

above stated eight propositions, therefore one of them must be a complete description of the actual world. The same view has been held by Wittgenstein as follows:

"If all true elementary proposition are listed, the world is completely described. A complete description of the world is given by listing all elementary propositions and then listing which of them one true and which false'. T4.26.

George Pitcher has concluded that neither Wittgenstein has said forth that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions nor he (Pitcher) finds the way as to how that thesis could be established. Wittgenstein has not cared to place on record, the reasons for holding his view true though he might have assumed the thesis uncritically. Pitcher wants to stress that his objection have no force against a view which says:

"Let us assume that the truth-functional operations are the only ones there are and let us see how far we can get in constructing all molecular propositions out of elementary ones, using just those operations and no others". He further says, "My objections would not in any way impugn Wittgenstein's view of truth-functions conceived as a program; they have force only against that view when it is conceived as being the only possible one there could be. But that is clearly the way Wittgenstein thought of it. There is

not the air of a program or any envisaging of possible alternatives in the flat statement":

"A proposition is a truth function of elementary propositions". T.5(1).

The theory of propositions propounded by Wittgenstein in his famous "Tractatus" has very important and farreaching consequences wherein he has held that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. The propositions have been classified in three groups:

- (1) Tautologies: Those whose truth tables assign them truth values of truth only,
- (2) Descriptive propositions: Those whose truth tables assign them truth-values of both truth and falsity,
- (3) Contradiction: Those whose truth-tables assign them truth-values of falsity only. •

Only the descriptive proposition says anything whereas the other two say nothing. Descriptive propositions can say only that certain state of affairs or certain truth functional combinations of them exist or do not exist. The entire discussion is confined to assertion about state of affairs. Similarly, the whole thought is limited: Wittgenstein also holds similar view:

"A thought is a proposition with a sense". T4.

Thus, the limitation of language and thought are the

same. The propositional sign theory of Wittgenstein was a general one and there was nothing about it being verbal or written. Therefore, whatever his theory says is applicable to mental as well as linguistic signs (words). Wittgenstein wrote a letter to Russell in 1919:

"I do not know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language.....". Does a *Gedanke* consist of Words"? No.! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I do not know". (N.B:PP.129-30).

Thus, it is clear from this that any thought can be put into words, and a thought which can not be put into words is not a thought. There can not be a thought which can not be put into words, may be someone does not recall proper words immediately. There may be a feeling that limitations placed by Wittgenstein's theory of propositions on language and thought permit us full freedom to say and think and do not put any restrictions. But this freedom could be a great mistake because Wittgenstein's views limit the statements on natural science because the propositions of natural sciences, according to Wittgenstein, are the same as in descriptive propositions which assert the existence and non-existence of states of affairs or some truth-functional combination of both:

"Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs".T4.1 .

"The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)".T4.11

Since, descriptive propositions assert all that can be said, the propositions of the natural sciences assert all that can be said. Wittgenstein says:

"The correct method in philosophy would really be the following:

To say nothing except what can be said i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy..." T6.53.

It is notable that Wittgenstein uses the expression 'proposition of natural science' in these passages, in a broad manner which would not be counted like general propositions as the propositions of natural science, though he would include them in descriptive propositions. He means:

"Descriptive propositions include the propositions of natural sciences and ordinary propositions of every day life that are reducible to (analyzable into) elementary propositions".

This view of descriptive propositions places strong limitations on what can be said. It discards many things which can not be said whereas philosophers and other ordinary people think that they can say. It rules out all

the thoughts of things e.g. pertaining to metaphysical entities which in Wittgenstein's terms, are neither the objects in themselves nor complexes of them (preferably complexes of the states of affairs). This rejection is based on the theory that any descriptive proposition must be either an elementary proposition or a truth-function of elementary propositions.

Thus, according to the 'Tractatus' we are strongly restricted from whatever language we speak in describing the kind of situation or the kind of reality, we may think or talk about. We may say that corresponding limits are imposed, by the limits of the language, on the reality that can be described, discussed, talked or thought about. Wittgenstein thinks further and places even stronger point whereby the qualifying clause that can be described or thought' may be dropped from the phrase - 'reality that can be described or thought'. It can be simply said that the limits of language impose corresponding limits on reality or, in short, the limits of language are the limits of reality, of the world. Thus, the qualifying clause deserves to be dropped for the reasons:

"(1) The limits of language are the limits of the only reality that can be described or thought, but ofcourse (2) there may be some other reality beyond this limited reality".

We can not say so because the proposition (2) is self-erroneous because it talks about a reality which it claims that it can not be talked about. Thus, once the clause (2) is discarded, then there is no meaningful contrast in the phrase - 'reality that can be described or thought', therefore, the qualifying expression 'that can be described or thought'; therefore the qualifying expression - 'that can be described or thought', which is superfluous, must be dropped because it can not be applied to any thing. Wittgenstein puts the same as follows:

"Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also it's limits".

"So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that',"

"For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this can not be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well".

"We can not think what we can not think; so what we can not think we can not say either". T5.61.

Thus, the limits of language are the limits of the world and language is the totality of all propositions which has been expressed by Wittgenstein as follows:

"The totality of propositions is language"., T4.001

It is beyond reach of a person to acquire full knowledge of language which would take something towards omniscience. For knowing all the propositions and their truth & falsity, one would need an enormous amount of knowledge something more than the capacity of individual. Because it requires vast knowledge of many terms and their definitions and capacity to analyse the propositions containing them; and all the different kinds of states of affairs for understanding all kinds of elementary propositions which in all probability can not be managed by a single person. Therefore, the language is an ideal which cannot be overpowered by an individual who in all probability can manage only a limited part of the whole ideal and that part of the ideal can be claimed by him as his language, whereas he is unable to understand all kinds of propositions.

Since the limits of the language or the limits of the thoughts, so the limits of one's language are the limits of his thought and like 'the language are the limits of the world', the limits of his language are the limits as his world. This view has been expressed by Wittgenstein as below:

"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world".T5.6.

The above stated view leads Wittgenstein to the

discussion of 'Solipsism' in 'Tractatus' 5.62 and 5.64 which may be defined as 'the view that only one's own self and what one experiences exist; what is not experienced by oneself, including otherselves, does not exist. There is a sense in which Wittgenstein agrees with solipsism. According to Wittgenstein the statement - "The world is my world" - is quite true which is the most natural way of expressing the theory of solipsism. Here, 'my world' means the world which I can talk or think about. Thus, my world is simply the world, just as the reality which can be described or thought, is simply the reality. Therefore, solipsism is a correct view but according to Wittgenstein the thesis of 'Solipsism' can not be expressed because what it wants or means to say can not be said. This is just a pity, because, as we experienced, what solipsism wants to say is correct.

However, what solipsism wants to say can not be said, it can be indicated and shown. This is the interpretation of the following view of Wittgenstein:

"For what the solipsist means is quite correct, only it can not be said, but makes itself manifest". T5.62(2).

"The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world". T5.62(3).

According to Wittgenstein solipsism should not be interpreted in dualistic way: Solipsism, properly

interpreted in dualistic way: Solip-sism, properly understood is the view that only what oneself experiences exists: The other dualistic presentation is a thinking, knowing, metaphysical self which must be rejected. He claims that there is no such entity: T5.631(1). "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas". According to Wittgenstein the self can not be part of reality; it is "the limit of the world not a part of it". (T.5.641[1]). It observes reality and not a part of reality. Thus, solipsism properly interpreted, is the view that these are all that exist.

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CHAPTER - II

WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE IN TRACTATUS-II

The language concept of Wittgenstein and his search for the essence of language is closely related to certain ontological issues i.e. the structure of the World. He held the view that language depicts the real structure of the world. According to him objects and facts are only counter-parts of names and propositions - the requirements of a significant language. It would be wrong to conclude that there is one way relation between language and reality. Actually 'Ontology' and 'Semantics' interact mutually and their relationship is "too complex to be reduced to a simple formula"¹. In all probability it is correct that ontology incorporated in the beginning of Tractatus, should have been incorporated as the "last part to be composed"² and that the "real starting point is a theory of meaning, not a directly intuited ontology"³. But it is proper that Wittgenstein begins with the descriptions of world, object and fact according to complex mutual interaction of both.

The common view is that the world is totality of things. But Wittgenstein, who originally maintains this tradition, contradicts from it and declares in Tl.1: "The world is totality of facts, not of things".

Though, Wittgenstein replaces things by facts, he

does not discard things. He holds that objects are the substance of the world, but they are not the primary constituents into which the world is divided. The ontological and linguistic considerations are responsible for the change of earlier view of Wittgenstein to his later view.

The ontological reasons which enabled Wittgenstein to amend his traditional view on his logical concept that objects, which "make up the substance of the world" (T2.021) can not exist separately away from facts. This view is evident from his following statements:

1. "It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact".(T2.011).
2. "If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I can not think of it apart from the possibility of this context".(T2.0121(5)).

But Wittgenstein himself contradicts from his aforesaid view and says:

"Substance is what exists independently of what is the case".(T2.024).

This seems to be his mistaken view. Because when he says that a substance is independent of what is the case, he actually means that a particular object is independent of a particular fact in which it occurs. An object can not be confined to a particular fact. It may occur in many facts.

His assumption, that an object can occur in one fact only, is wrong and misconceived. In case it is claimed to be true, then his own statement that 'an object can not exist apart from the facts' and his assertions that 'a substance is what exists independently of what is the case' would have been contradictory.

Thus, an object is an independent fact, but it must exist in some fact. Wittgenstein has himself explained this point in T2.0122: "The thing is independent, in so far it can occur in all possible circumstances, but this form of independence is a form of connection with the atomic fact, a form of dependence. It is impossible for words to occur in two different ways, alone and in the proposition". This makes it clear as to why according to Wittgenstein, the world is divided into facts and not into things. Therefore, Wittgenstein holds the view that the primary units of the world are facts not things.

The second ontological view of Wittgenstein is that the World can be known by the actual order of the objects. Thus the world can be described by facts and not by objects.

The third view is that "material properties are formed only by the configuration of objects."⁴ Thus, the real world is not of the structures of only objects and their forms but of flesh and blood.

Lastly, the historical change of the World can not be

described with the details of non-destructible and unalterable simple and permanent objects because mere the list of fixed and static things is not the world.

So far the Linguistic reasons are concerned all the philosophers have analysed the basic constituents of the world through their own methods. Wittgenstein made his analysis through language whereas the earlier philosophers' analysis was based on examination of objects and related ideas.

The term 'fact' is used by English knowing persons in different ways in their common dialogue and the same drill is in practice in Germany of the term 'Tatsache'. But Wittgenstein's view is that the term 'fact' denotes a kind of ontological reality though ordinary use can not suffice to break with the tradition. The ordinary uses of the term fact do not prohibit from holding the view that the World is a totality of things and facts both. But his notions of meaning and truth alongwith ordinary uses of the term 'fact' enabled Wittgenstein to hold his view that the World is the totality of facts and not of things. According to Wittgenstein a statement should be confined by reality because what denotes to a statement is a fact and not a thing. A fact can be stated, asserted, denied and described but a thing can not be so.

The question about the primary unit of language has

always been disturbing the philosophers and logicians. For English experts the primary unit of the language is a term. To them a proposition is a combination of terms which are meaningful. The idealist logicians opposed this view and F.H. Bradley was the staunch supporter of the idealist doctrine of judgement. Wittgenstein maintains Bradley's tradition in the 'Tractatus' that unless used in a proposition names have no meaning. He says: "Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a meaning". T3.3. Like Bradley, Wittgenstein held the view that the primary unit of language is proposition and not a name. Names can not make assertions about objects. They can do even naming only when used in a proposition. Wittgenstein holds the view that language or thought is totality of significant propositions. He writes:

"The thought is the significant proposition T.4.

"The totality of proposition is language". T4.001

"A proposition is simply the description of a fact".
T.4.023(3).

"To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true". T4.024(1).

"A proposition presents the existence and non-existence of atomic facts". T.4.1.

These statements signify that only proposition can convey sense and the state of affairs represented by it is

the sense of a proposition. Without the states of affairs the language will fail to convey any sense. Accordingly, if a proposition is to be true, there must be actual state of affairs i.e. facts. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, atomic facts are necessary for the sense and truth of language, i.e. language is possible only if there are facts. With this view the World is said to be the totality of facts and not of things.

Summarisingly both ontological and linguistic considerations help Wittgenstein to divide the World into facts instead of things. Thus we find that this view is not an unqualified rejection of the common belief of holding the world to be the totality of things. It is a modified vision of the World necessitated by Wittgenstein's logical investigations about the nature of objects, sense and truth.

Some aspects of the justification of Wittgenstein's theory and question regarding actual fact have been well discussed at length by the leading philosophers like Moore, 5 Strawson 6 and Austin 7 whose joint view would help us in better study of Wittgenstein's efforts as a whole. If we wish to avoid the possibility of mistakes in handling the problems before us we should look at certain fact and its uses in common language as it seems to have been used by Wittgenstein himself. The uses of 'fact' denote some thing settled, unquestioned and true especially in the doubtful

and suspicious situations. It can not be claimed that 'fact' has been used to denote some concrete reality. It is just a linguistic device which does not refer to any objective reality, as such, it can not be termed as absolute necessity. But there are other uses of the term 'fact' which denote the statement of reality or state of things making assertions of the situations. Strawson also agrees that "even in general statement the term 'fact' is used in a compendious way to express particular assertions of a class"⁸.

The term 'fact' has been interpreted by the philosophers for certain realities and it may be a philosophical use but it has been rejected by 'Austin'⁹ who says that "fact was in origin a name for something in the World...."¹⁰. He further says, "Any connection between 'fact' and 'knowledge' and still more between 'fact' and 'truth' (in particular the use of 'a fact' as equivalent to 'a truth') is a derivative and comparatively late connection"¹¹. Lastly he says, "The expression 'fact that' is later still, and was introduced as a grammatical convenience, because of the already existing meaning of 'fact'. To explain the meaning of 'fact' in terms of the expression 'fact that' is to invert the real order of things....."¹².

Strawson holds the view that 'facts' are pseudo

entities and not anything genuine like things, persons, and events. He says, "The only plausible candidate for the position of what (in the World) makes the statement true is the fact it states; but the fact it states is not something in the world"¹³. If we read "World" (a sadly corrupted world) as "heavens and earths", a talk of facts, situations and state of affairs as "included in" or "parts of" the World is, obviously, metaphorical. The world is the totality of things not of facts.

There is no such mention in the Notebooks or in the Tractatus which may compell us to say that Wittgenstein's views are based on the ordinary usage of 'fact'. Thus, we may measure that his observation is based on a priori linguistic and extra-linguistic considerations because it is not merely a linguistic method. For him 'fact' is extra linguistic and makes linguistic propositions true which is based on his logical analysis of language. The World consists of statements and not of names which are lifeless if not used in statements. A statement is the initial unit of important language which, as resultant is the initial unit of reality corresponding to the true statement called as fact.

The following factors must be kept well in mind for understanding the Wittgenstein's theory about World, 'fact' and object:

1. Wittgenstein did not use the term 'fact' and 'object' in the ordinary sense.

2. His approach to the problem was based on a priori analysis of language and not on other's views. According to him an important language predetermines the probability of atomic-facts and objects whose presence is a must for understanding the meaning of the language.

Now the important question arises as to what is an atomic fact according to Wittgenstein? The T1's and T2's contain the important points about fact. That T1's describe that the world is all that is the case and the World is the totality of facts and not of things. The World, divides, ultimately, into unit-facts, facts which are simple or atomic (Sachverhalt). In the T2's Wittgenstein discusses about the formation of facts, their structure and shape with those of their existence or non-existence.

Thus, it is important to know as to what is an atomic fact and how it is formed? An atomic fact is the primary unit of the World which is the existing state of affairs and is called unit-facts. The complexity of facts is bound to be divided into atomic facts under the minute analysis, which cannot be divided further and are the simpler facts. It is these unit-facts into which the World ultimately divides (T2.04). They are the essential stuff of the World. The presence of atomic facts is essentially that what a

proposition states in reality as per Wittgenstein who describes that the sense of proposition represents the states of affairs and it is true if it is actual. For determining a proposition to be true or false its comparison with reality is essential as referred to in T2.201, 2.202, 2.203, 2.21, 2.221, 2.222, 2.223, 2.224, 2.225, 4.21. Thus, there must be atomic facts if the statements are true otherwise the reality of proposition can not be relied on. There is no language without facts, and names are combined in elementary propositions wherein atomic facts are ontological counterparts and are the essential requirements of a particular language.

The atomic facts can not be analysed into facts but they are analysed into objects. In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way (T2.031). It is clear that Wittgenstein does not use 'fact' in ordinary way where they are not regarded as combination of things. According to Wittgenstein's use of fact even as a simple state of affairs is combination of objects in a definite way which is not found in the ordinary use of fact. For Wittgenstein atomic facts are combination of things which form the World. (Dingen). But atomic fact is a configuration (Konfiguration) (T2.0272) and not a collection of things. In it the objects are combined in a definite way (T2.031). "The way in which objects hang together (Zusammenhang) in the atomic fact"

T2.032. He says in 2.033, "The form (Dieform) is the possibility (Möglichkeit) of the structure". It means the structure is the configuration of the objects in the atomic fact, and the possibility of this configuration is it's form.

In this view of form Wittgenstein is probably "influenced by the analogy of a spatial arrangement of a set of material bodies"¹⁴. Their independence is another important feature of atomic fact. Wittgenstein states at 2.061.2: "States of affairs are independent of one another. From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another". Similarly he states in 1.21 "Anyone can either be the case or not be the case and everything else remain the same". While talking of inference he elaborates the same point:

"From an elementary proposition no other can be inferred". T5.134.

In no way can an inference be made from the existence of one state of affairs to the existence of another entirely different from it. T5.135.

There is no casual nexus which justifies such an inference. T5.136.

The events of future can not be inferred from those of the present. T5.136.

The atomic facts are visualised from their atomicity and simplicity. As stenius says, "Whether or not the descriptive content of what is usually called a (logically) compound sentence is the case, is, of course, not independent of the truth or falsehood of, for instance, it's components that is, of whether the descriptive contents of the components are or are not the case"¹⁵. The independent states of affairs are rated simple by Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein makes a distinction between the world (welt) and reality (Wiklichkeit) when he says:

The facts in the logical space are the world.T1.13.

The World divides into facts. T.1.2.

The totality of existent atomic facts is the world.
T.2.04.

Accordingly the World is identified with the totality of existent atomic facts which constitute the world and are divided by it. The question arises then as to what is meant by reality? Wittgenstein states at T2.06(1):

"The existence and non-existence of atomic-facts is the reality". It denotes that reality is wider than the world which includes, besides positive (existent) facts, the negative facts also i.e. a state of affairs which does not exists. Thus, the World is the sum totalof reality.

The study of object is equally important because without knowing its concept it is difficult to understand the philosophy of Tractarians. According to Wittgenstein objects are the constituents of atomic fact. An atomic fact is a combination of objects (T2.01). It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact (T2.011). The following two conclusions are derived from the aforesaid statements:

1. Facts are combination of things and having structures they are complex whereas objects having no structures are simples. Thus, objects and facts belong to different categories.

2. Objects are essential parts of facts which is logically impossible to prove. But objects can not exist alone. A thing is, no doubt, is independent of a particular fact but it may be found in some fact. Thus, it's independence is paradoxically enough, a form of dependence (T2.0122). Wittgenstein propounds so on the following grounds:

1. Logical conception:

Wittgenstein says, "In Logic nothing is accidental! if a thing can occur in an atomic fact, the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing". (T2.012). His comment on this statement is: "It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could

exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit". T2.0121(4). Thus, there is no possibility of accidental presence of object in fact because facts are constituted by objects only.

2. Possible occurrences:

"In order to know an object I must know all it's possible occurrences in atomic facts" (T2.0123). In the nature of object lies every possibility and as such a new possibility is not possible. Wittgenstein says: "In order to know an object, I must know not it's external but all it's internal qualities". (T2.01231). He further says: "The possibility of it's occurrence in atomic facts is the form of the object". T2.0141), Without its internal form the idea of object cannot be conceived. Internal form is the possibility of it's occurrence in atomic facts. "This is why objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs". (T2.014). Thus, the object can not exist on it's own independent of facts because internal form, an essential requirement of the object, is the possibility of it's occurrence in the possible atomic facts.

3. Object and atomic fact are inseparable:

Since the possibility of occurrence in the possible fact is the essential requirement of an object's existence just like the space and time which are essential requirements of spatial and temporal objects. Wittgenstein

also says:

"Just we can not think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we can not think of any object apart from the possibility of it's connections with other things. If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact I can not think of it apart from the possibility of this context". T2.0121(d,e).

The other important characteristic of the object, according to Wittgenstein as given at T2.02 is: "The object is simple (einfach)". He further says: "Every statement about complexes can be analysed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complexes (T2.0201)".

Wittgenstein claims that the simplicity of objects can be analysed to simples. He says 'that a fully analysed proposition consists of only names'. T3.25. A name means an object (T3.203). The meaning of a name is the object it refers to and if the object is complex, the term denotes it's description and not a name which needs further analysis. The smallest and further decomposable simples are described as objects by Wittgenstein. The reason of describing simples in the Tractatus have been made clear in his Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein wherein he says:

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What can not be destroyed; what remains the same in all changes. But what is that? Why it swam before our minds as we said the sentence: This was the very expression of a quite particular image - of a particular picture which we want to use. For certainly experience does not show us these elements. We see component parts of something composite (of a chair, for instance). We say that the back is part of the chair, but is in turn itself composed of several bits of wood; while a leg is simple component part, we also see a whole which changes (is destroyed), while, it's component parts remain unchanged. These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality". (P.I. Sec.59).

Wittgenstein claims: "Objects form the substance of the world, therefore they can not be compound". T.2.021. Since the objects form the substance of the world, they must be simple. Wittgenstein places his arguments in support of the presence of substance:

"If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true". T2.0211.

"It would then be impossible to form a picture of the World (true or false)". T2.0212".

Wittgenstein further says that 'objects are unalterable and subsistent. Because objects are fixed or unalterable, they are common to all possible worlds'. (T2.022 and T2.023). He says, "Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable". T2.0271. He means to say that objects remain unaffected. It is only complex that is composed or decomposed. He means: "Names refer to objects which can not be destroyed and remain the same in all changes". P.I. Sec.59. But this argument is not sufficient. Thus, the question arises: What are objects? Are they Universals, or properties and relations, or particulars or all of this? Though they are simple, unalterable substances of the world, but to which of the above categories do they belong?

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Russell-the propounder of the Wittgenstein view says: "Logical atoms include both particulars and Universals"¹⁶. Stenius holds: "They include particulars, simple properties and relations". He maintains that "...Things and predicates are complementary in that things can only enter into facts or states of affairs as bearers of predicates. A connection between individual things only, therefore, can not form an atomic state of affairs"¹⁷. I.M. Copi holds the view that objects are particulars¹⁸. In the traditional philosophy

particulars occupy a limited part of space and time and are supposed as unique individuals. Therefore, it can not be claimed that they can be predicated of anything. 'Universals' are general and can be predicated of something. They have properties (Redness, circularity) and relations (being next to, greater than). As evident from the following, the descriptions of Wittgenstein about objects, can be said for 'particulars':

"An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things) T.2.01".

"The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact (T2.0272)".

"In the atomic fact objects hang in one another like the links of chain. T.2.03".

It is certainly a good language to say that some particulars are combined or configurated but it is wrong to say that a particular is combined with a universal.

In favour of particulars firstly Wittgenstein says that the names are the simple symbols, I indicate them by single letters (X Y Z): The elementary proposition I write as functions of the names, in the form "fx", O (XY)", etc. or I indicate it by the letters p,q,r".T4.24. He says that a function of names is different from the combination of names which means that 'f' and 'O' are not names and universals are not objects.

Secondly, Wittgenstein says:

"We must not say, The Complex, sign 'a Rb' says 'a' stands R to b"; but we must say, "that 'a' stands in a certain relation to 'b' says that aRb". T3.1432.

Agreeing with the interpretation of paragraph T3.1432 by I.M.Copi¹⁹, Wittgenstein says that in an adequate notation the sign 'R' would not appear. There appear the names for the particulars 'a' and 'b' and no name for the relations R. The fact that 'a' stands in relation R to b is expressed in an adequate notation by a proposition containing only two words: 'a' and 'b'. But immediately the question arises that if propositional signs contain no words for relations, how can they express facts related to? Wittgenstein replies that the relation of objects is expressed by a relation of their names. He says, "The essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs" T3.1431. It indicates the spatial arrangement of things represented by a particular fact. Since the relation of objects can be expressed by the relation of their names, no relational word is required to indicate the relation of objects because relations are not the objects.

Wittgenstein says in 'Notes on Logic':

"Symbols are not what they seem to be. In "aRb", "R"

looks like a substantive but it is not one. What symbolises in "aRb" is that "R" occurs between "a" and "b". Hence "R" is not the indefinable in "aRb". Note Books, P.39. The relation which relates two objects is not an object and Wittgenstein also says so. He describes that relations are only ways of showing the placement of the objects. Thirdly, about properties Wittgenstein says that objects are only particulars. He maintained during 1914-16 period that universals are included in the class of objects. As written in entry for 16.6.15. "Relations and properties etc, are objects too". But he makes no mention in "Tractatus" about this view. 'Stenius'²⁰ has, though given an argument which is not maintainable. Pitcher²¹ has opposed this view holding the view that property of an object is not a matter being configured with a universal but rather being configured with other simple particulars e.g. the state of affairs a's being red. When it is said that 'a' is red it means that a's particulars are configured in a definite way. So the real form of 'a' is red and it is neither a red nor 'a b c d' but 'e f g h'. Here 'e f g h' are the particulars which form the complex 'a' which is red. This view is similar to that of Wittgenstein's about properties who describes properties in terms of relations. The object with a property eg. redness depends on it's elements being related in a particular manner. Wittgenstein says at T.2.02311:

"The substance of the World can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented only by the configuration of objects that they are produced". Fourthly, the consideration of colours holds the view that properties are not objects. Wittgenstein says: "It is a sign of an elementary proposition, that no elementary proposition can contradict it". T.4.211. But two propositions, one asserting a given point to be red and other asserting it to be blue must differ each other if properties are objects and elementary propositions are combination of names of objects. The assertion that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time, is a contradiction. T.6.2751. Wittgenstein holds the view that simple objects have no structures, and anything having structure is a fact and not an object. In 'a red' 'a' must be a complex having a red structure, a red object is red. Similarly like colour it is true about sounds too because sounds also have structure. (NB ENTY FOR 11.9.16). Similarly it is true of the circular form (NB. Enty For 18.6.15). These properties are not objects. Being structural these properties depend on the configuration of objects.

Lastly, Wittgenstein, after mentioning the 'Theaetetus' philosophy that "Primary elements can only be named" holding this view says in P.I.Sec 46:

"Both Russel's individuals and my 'objects' (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements". As established by these considerations Wittgenstein's objects are simple particulars.

Unless one has a clear picture of Wittgenstein's criterion of simplicity, it can not be determined what exactly the objects are. The questions related to Wittgenstein's objects being simple particulars, can be replied only after knowing his criterion of simplicity about which he has given no hint for the readers. The entire matter can be found out only from guess and conjectures one of them being anthropocentric i.e. something determined is counted as an object. More clearly the simple object would be determined by the language to be used. What seems simple in the language so used corresponding in the world is counted as simple. Maslow agrees to this view and says:

"And my contention.....is that any criterion or rule of simplicity whatsoever is to be arbitrarily assigned by ourselves, and that there is nothing in reality to impose upon us any rule"²².

The following remarks of Wittgenstein do not encourage to accept the foregoing suggestions:

"That objects form the substance of the World".(T.2.021)

"That objects exist independently of what is the

case".(T.2.024)

"That objects are fixed, unalterable".(T.2.0271).

"That there is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition.(T.3.25).

"That this analysis is not arbitrary".(T.3.3442).

Wittgenstein says: "Even if the World is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then, there must be objects and atomic facts".(T4.2211).

As evident from these convictions,Wittgenstein can not be a propounder of the view that analysis can be or stopped arbitrarily. Objects are simple and free from our language and their simplicity can not be measured by the language we use. Wittgenstein himself does not side the language and holds the view that there must be simples to describe the importance of the language but it does not compell him to accept the view that the language imposes the simplicity. Maslow holds it a wrong interpretation to say that "the definitions of sense is not, of course,absolute but only relative to our language and to the context in which a proposition is used"²³. Maslow himself accepts that there are metaphysical tendencies in the 'Tractatus'²⁴. He says that Wittgenstein at times means by 'object' the ultimate ontological entities, something akin to Santayana's

'essences' and Whitehead's 'objects',²⁵. But he rejects this aspect while interpreting the 'Tractatus' positivistically. For Wittgenstein 'object' is the ontological substance of the world. But he never cares to discuss in detail the questions as to what exactly an object is? and what is actual example of such an object. In T5.55 he openly maintains that he is not concerned with the actual examples because the actual analysis is out of the scope of logic. He holds that there must be names and elementary propositions, objects and atomic facts because logic demands them and not because experience exhibits them. It is his firm belief that a proposition can have a definite sense only if expressed in elementary propositions. He means there must be objects and he never bothers to give examples. Malcolm discloses that Wittgenstein himself replied him "that as a logician it was not his business to try to decide whether it was a simple thing or a complex thing that being a purely empirical matter. From this it was clear that he regarded his former opinion as absurd"²⁶. He was misled by this sublime logical view. Had he realised the importance of actual examples, he would have realized this fallacy much earlier. It is now necessary to understand what the simple objects really are. Griffin and Pitcher identify simples with material points. Wittgenstein himself had held: "The division of the body into material points, as we have it in physics, is nothing

more than analysis into simple components",²⁷. Further, from a variety of examples that Wittgenstein offers⁴⁵, it is easy to find out that his simple objects are material points. His method of analysis also suggests that by objects he means material points.

There are certain difficulties in accepting the material points which need to be solved. The biggest difficulty in this interpretation is the problem of naming the objects. The idea of sense involves correlation between names and objects. According to Wittgenstein's view the meaning of a name is the object it denotes which means that for knowing the name one should know the object it denotes. Thus, the objects are to be observed for which the direct acquaintance is necessary. But how direct acquaintance can be made with the objects like material points. Simple qualities can be observed whereas objects are not qualities. Even universal qualities are not objects and all the observable objects are complex which have structure subject to further analysis. Wittgenstein states in the 'Note books',²⁹ that we have no acquaintance with simple objects. Pitcher and Griffin both admit this difficulty. Griffin says, "It is not clear how one would name material simples. On my interpretation naming would have to be totally divorced from acquaintance"³⁰. But he has no alternative to explain the process of naming. Pitcher tries to explain it

with the help of Wittgenstein's remarks that "If I know an object, I also know all it's possible occurrences in states of affairs". (T2.0123). Thus he holds that objects can be known without acquaintance with them. He says, "To know an object just is to know what sorts of states of affairs it can enter into, and that is to know what Wittgenstein calls it's internal properties"³¹. But without knowing them individually how can we know even the internal properties of the objects. Pitcher himself admits it half heartedly: "To know objects in this way, it must be confessed, is not to know them very well. I can not, for example, know them as individuals"³². Thus, how simple objects are named and how language connects up with the World remains a mystery. It is a major defect in the highly acclaimed Tractarian philosophy. 'David Keyt'³³ has ably argued to make out a case for the sense-datum interpretation with equal force. He says: "What I try to show in the rest of this paper is that a sense-datum interpretation if properly construed, in fact encounters fewer difficulties than the material point interpretation. Probably the wisest conclusion to reach is that Wittgenstein, in so far he was concerned with the question of examples at all, did intend for the Tractatus to embrace both interpretations"³⁴. Wittgenstein himself has used the sense-datum language. At times visual sense data or their parts are given as examples of objects³⁵.

The difficulties faced in material point interpretation and use of sense-datum language by Wittgenstein strongly recommend that according to Wittgenstein objects are things like sense-datum which solves the naming problem according to which objects are observable and can be named easily. The contents of the Tractatus, describing facts as basic units of experience and elementary propositions, confirm this view regarding sense-datum because of their being observation based statements.

But this interpretation does not find support from the following objections:

(1) Since Wittgenstein holds the possibility (T. 2.014) and existence (T2.027) of objects and his sense datum-view are either actual or not at all, there is no use in their being claimed just the possibility only. Accordingly the existence of sense-data is not maintainable.

(2) Elementary proposition and interpretation of sense-datum differ to each other. Therefore, the proposition denoting colours can not be an elementary proposition because the elementary propositions are logically independent of each other (T.4.211).

(3) According to Wittgenstein objects do not determine material properties and they are formed by the configuration of objects. Having structure material properties are subject

to analysis. The application of observable property to anything reveals that the simple constituents of this complex take shape in a definite manner. Thus, properties which are products, can not be treated as objects because according to Wittgenstein's view objects are colourless. Therefore, the interpretation of sense-datum and Wittgenstein's view of elementary proposition do not tally with the theory of properties propounded by Wittgenstein.

Thus, material point and sense datum interpretation are full of difficulties and do not find proper support. The particulars and universals categories of objects demonstrated by Wittgenstein do not solve the problem because the basic question arises as to what these objects can really be: The conceptions of meaning and analysis are not properly covered by object and sense-datum languages of Wittgenstein as such this problem remains incomplete and requires its solutions. The main cause of the whole trouble was the reductive analytical theory of Wittgenstein which misled him to believe that real form of proposition can be discovered through analysis. He was of the firm believe that the demands of his logic must be fulfilled by experience. He failed to understand that there is no ideal of exactness and as such he was mislead by his ideals of exact sense and absolute simples because exactness and simplicity are considered by the situations in which they are considered.

But Wittgenstein was far from this settled principle. Since the Tractatus was written under the influence of a superstition the entire problem is misconceived. Going through the misunderstanding and discarding wrong inferences are the only solutions to this problem which lie in dropping the idea of determining reality of objects. This view is similar with the later reactions of Wittgenstein about his earlier theory.

The study of Tractatus enlivens the firm view that the theory of simples propounded by Wittgenstein is totally wrong and misconceived. Thus, the theory of atomic facts based on configurations of simples is automatically found baseless because if there are no simples there can not be atomic facts. With this inference, the whole palace of Tractatus is broken into pieces.

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CHAPTER - III

"REJECTION OF THE EARLIER THEORY OF LANGUAGE"

Wittgenstein had no keen interest in academic life as evident from his life, character, likes and dislikes. Originally an engineer he converted as a philosopher. He wrote 'Tractatus' and after its completion he was satisfied with the concept that the main problems of philosophy were solved. Thus, after the First World War he retired from the field of Philosophy rather abandoned it, with the view that, there was no need of further studies any more.

In 1928, Wittgenstein happened to be in Vienna where he had discussions with Ramsey and other important members of the Vienna Circle, which led him to serious independent thinking. It is the common truth that the strong confidence, of even the important philosophers who are committed to their views, starts shaking and crumbling. Wittgenstein too could not escape from this and was shaken. He himself has stated in the Preface to his Philosophical Investigations (Page X) about his discussion with Ramsey:

"Since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again... I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book [i.e. the Tractatus]. I was helped to realize these mistakes to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I

discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life".

After his meetings with, Ramsey and others including listening of a very important lecture of Brouwer on foundation of mathematics, Wittgenstein by and by lost his confidence in the maintainability of his Tractarian Philosophy and decided to resume Philosophy and to make some important contributions. In early 1929, he returned to Cambridge and submitted 'Tractatus' as his thesis for the degree of "Doctor of Philosophy" and published a paper on 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' to the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.

Though his esteem confidence in his aforesaid publication was shaken he was not yet convinced that his theory of 'Tractatus' was false otherwise he would not have submitted it for academic distinctions. However, new thoughts and ideas were hunting his mind but he was rather confused. He himself disclosed this fact to 'Moore' who reports as below:

"Something to the effect that, when he wrote it (i.e. "Some Remarks on Logical Form"), he was getting new ideas about which he was still confused, and that he did not think it deserved any attention"².

During 1930 and onwards Wittgenstein, almost every year, gave lectures in Cambridge which had been described

by his students; and the words went round that he was developing radically a new philosophy, different from that of the 'Tractatus'. Later on, the students of his class had dictations from him about sensation and imagination, thought and meaning, realism, idealism and solipsism besides other important topics which were known as Blue and Brown Books finally expressed in his Philosophical Investigations. Thus, after the lapse of a decade and more, he realized that his theories propounded by him in 'Tractatus' were really false.

It seems that Wittgenstein was compelled by the strong criticism of P. Sraffa which led him to abandon his Tractarian views. "He said that his discussions with Sraffa made him feel like a tree from which all branches had been cut"³.

It is important to consider the objections to his earlier thoughts which Wittgenstein improved upon in the "Philosophical Investigations". There are two reasons for doing so: Firstly, for knowing the causes of discarding his earlier views, Secondly, for understanding his later views which can be well-understood in the light of earlier ones. Wittgenstein himself has expressed his view in this connection in Preface to the Investigations:

"Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should

publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking"⁴(P9.p.X.)

Later, Wittgenstein was convinced that his theory of reductive__ analysis described in the 'Tractatus' was unwarranted and misleading. He conveys that division of something is not established by that thing only because there is not only one way of considering that thing. It can be considered from different angles as such there are various ways of analysing a thing. Pitcher also says; "One account might be better for some points of view, another better for other purposes or more appropriate from other points of view"⁵.

Therefore, it is not correct to say that the world divides into facts and not into things. As pointed out by Wisdom, in his 'Logical Constructions;' it may be divided into facts or things or events. Wittgenstein condemns his own theory of absolute simples stating in 'Tractatus' that names describe absolutely simple things and states of affairs are described by propositions which are necessarily complex. He argues that it is wrong to describe a thing either simple or complex.

A thing is either simple or complex in a particular context. His later theory described in the Investigations

clarifies that nothing is either simple or absolutely complex. He asserts a thing may be called simple in a certain context, for some purposes or when, looked at from a particular point of view. The same thing may be called composite in other contexts from a different point of view or from some other purpose. Therefore, simplicity and complexity are not qualities of things themselves. Wittgenstein states so:

"If I tell someone without any further explanation: what I see before me how is composite", he will have the right to ask: what do you mean by composite? For there are all sorts of things that can mean!" The question "Is what you see composite?" makes good sense if it is established already, what kind of complexity is, which that particular use of the word is in question". (PI, Sec. 47).

He thinks that it is a typical mistake that philosophers talk of things apart of all contexts-treating them in absolute terms. He questions himself in Philosophical Investigations PI, Sec. 47: "Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts"? The correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by 'composite' ". (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question).

Therefore, a thing makes no sense of the simple or

complex if it is isolated from all possible contexts and which depends on whether a thing is simple or composite. Wittgenstein says so: "We use the word "composite" and therefore the word "simple" in an enormous number of different and differently related ways".(PI,Sec.47).

Wittgenstein criticised exclusively his earlier views regarding conception of meaning. In the 'Tractatus' he has stated that:

- (1) The meaning of a word is the name of nothing it denotes,
- (2) The names of his absolutely simple objects are the only genuine proper names that there are.

He said that the meaning of a name (in his technical sense) is the object (in his technical sense) it denotes (T 3.203). Having declared that saying absolutely simple objects does not make any sense. The later Wittgenstein did not accept the above proposition (2). But proposition (1) being fundamental to the system of the 'Tractatus' remains so far intact. With the rejection of absolutely simple objects and words which name them, it is natural to follow that the words which are genuine proper names are such words which would ordinarily be called proper name. In his later volume Wittgenstein ruthlessly destroys proposition (1) as so construed ruthlessly and surprisingly quickly. It is a misuse of the word 'meaning' he now claims, to use it to

signify the thing that corresponds to the name (PI, Sect.40). He advocates that what corresponds to the name is its bearer, not its meaning: But in the 'Tractatus' he had confused the bearer of a name with the meaning of the name. So, the bearer of a name is one thing and its meaning is another. Wittgenstein says that meaning of a name is given by the various descriptions which apply to the bearer of the name and unable one to identify it. His view is quoted:

"We may say, following Russell: the name "Moses" can be defined by means of various descriptions. For example, as "the man who led the Israelites through the wilderness", "the man who lived at that time and place and was then called 'Moses' ", "the man who as a child was taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh's daughter" and so on. And according as we assume one definition or another the proposition "Moses did not exist" acquires a different sense and so does every other proposition about Moses".[PI,Sect.79].

He was perfectly right in rejecting his former opinion. Thus, the picture theory of proposition can not survive. It makes no sense to speak of absolutely simple, indestructible elements of reality i.e. what was called 'object' in the 'Tractatus'. Thus, one can not speak of states of affairs. With no absolutely simple objects only name them and do nothing. Therefore, there are no elementary propositions. Thus, with the removal of which was

supposed to be the picture and that one supposed to be pictured, the picture theory was vanished without trace.

Wittgenstein criticised his earlier assumptions about the mental act of meaning and intending. In *Tractatus* he faced the problem of explaining how a correlation is made between a word and the object it denotes, between a sentence and the situation it is used to describe how correlation is made between language and the world. Later on he came to the conclusion that his earlier view was fundamentally wrong. He rejects this theory in his *Blue Book* and *Investigations*. He concluded that when a set of words means nothing of itself and is different one from the act of saying them, then we should be able to say anything by any discretionary series of marks or sounds. For examples we should be able to say 'a b c d' and be able to mean by the mental wave of meaning': "The weather is fine". (PI.Sect.508). We may try it but it is too difficult because we are used to use alphabets as words. We may try another example and say:

"It is cold here" and mean "It is warm here". Can you do it? And what are you doing as you do it? And is there only one way of doing it? (PI. Sect.510).

Again if the act of meaning something by certain words is a different act from speaking them, then we should be able to say the first act without saying anything. These suggested experiments are absurd in some way because the

view is misguided. For example: Merely think that it will rain tomorrow without saying "It will rain tomorrow". Is it not absurd? (Blue Book, P.42).

Thus, Wittgenstein places a big list of arguments against his own earlier view that words get correlated with objects and facts in the world by the performance of mental acts of intending or meaning them to refer to those things. One can agree easily with his statement in the Investigations:

"Nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity!" (PI.Sect.693).

Thus the Tractarian Philosophy of young Wittgenstein was vanished by none else than he himself. As a young philosopher he had produced the 'Tractatus' with the result of his deep thoughts and untiring efforts which placed him in a very high esteem as a philosopher, who proved himself as a great Philosopher by virtue of, his deliberate ruthless and deadly efficiency, destroying the entire system of the 'Tractatus' by his later invention of 'Philosophical Investigations' with contrasting style and content.

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CHAPTER - IV

LANGUAGE GAME

The theory of meaning as use is closely connected with the concept of a language-game. In the Tractatus there is no mention of language-games, but the connection between meaning and use is already made. At (T.3.32) Wittgenstein distinguishes between sign and symbol. The sign is what is sensibly perceptible in the symbol and two different symbols may have their sign (spoken or written sounds) in common, where this is so they signify in different ways. In order to recognise the symbol in the sign, one has to look at the significacnt use. If a sign has no use, it is meaningless; on the other hand if everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it does have meaning. Part of it's use, it appears, is its logical syntax.

We are told 'A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logical syntactical employment: but employment must involve something in addition to logical form, because use is sufficient and necessary for meaning, whereas, in logical syntax the meaning of a sign must never play a role (T.L.P.33). What is lacking is presumably the correlation between signs, with their logico-syntactical properties and the reference of signs. This correlation, Wittgenstein then believed, was a psychological matter: it was no part of the task of the

philosopher, the theories of symbolism, to discover it.

The theory, developed in the Tractatus and rejected in the Investigations, is closely related to medieval realism (about universals) and to what has recently been termed essentialism. This theory may be put briefly in the following way: Only names have meaning. The meaning of a word is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. Objects are definite and absolutely simple. Propositions are combinations of such names. Consequently, language contains logical forms, which are concealed by ordinary language. The essence is hidden from us. Our task is to exhibit the hidden form - the essence of language and reality by reductive analysis. Analysis reveals the real structure of both language and reality. In this way, the language is the picture of the world. And learning a language consists in giving names to objects.

Wittgenstein has criticised all these ideas in the 'Philosophical Investigations'. The central idea is concerned with analysis. It may look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single completely resolved form of every expression. "This finds expression in question as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought.....Something that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing and which an analysis digs out."¹.

This view maintains that thought is surrounded by a halo. Its essence presents an order an a priori order common to both the world and language. The essence must be utterly simple and prior to all experience and no empirical cloudiness can affect it. It must rather be of the purest crystal. We are under the illusion, says Wittgenstein, that what is profound and essential is the essence. We think that there must be a perfect order in the vaguest expression. It never occurs to us to examine our actual language and see if this is so. We want to say that there cannot be any vagueness in logic. But "the more narrowly we examine our actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement"². The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round.

Wittgenstein says that the main function of language is to describe facts or situations, language is descriptive. He said in the Tractatus: "The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand", (T4.531). In his later works he realizes that we are misled by our craving for generality which results in unwarranted assimilations. According to Wittgenstein we are prone to assimilation. We assimilate different kinds: let us see first, how we assimilate different kinds of sentences. We divide sentences in to a limited number of grammatical type

which has an unique function. The function of a sentence is determined by its grammatical form. We think that all declarative sentences describe in the same way and so on. This is a grave mistake. According to Wittgenstein, "five slabs" functions both as a report and as an order the difference being only in the application. To take a different instance, it is commonly thought that the sentences in the interrogative mood are always used for asking questions. But the sentence, 'Is not the weather glorious today?' is used as a statement. Similarly, "May I come in? is used to beg permission. "You will do it", is used as a command, not as a report or prophecy. From these considerations Wittgenstein derives the following conclusions:

(1) The grammatical form of a sentence does not always tell us the function it is used to express. A sentence of a particular grammatical form may be used for various purposes. What is important then, is the application and not the grammatical form.

(2) It is totally wrong to maintain that a significant language has only one function, namely, to describe states of affairs. Wittgenstein says: But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question and command? There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this

multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten. (We can get a right picture of this from the changes in mathematics).

The following examples are showing the multiplicity of language-games:

"Giving orders, and obeying them

Describing the appearance of an object,

or giving its measurements

Constructing an object from a

description (a drawing)

Reporting an event

Speculating about an event

Forming and Testing a hypothesis

Presenting the results of an experiment in tables
and diagrams

Making up a story and reading it

Play-acting-

Singing catches-

Assessing riddles-

Making a joke, telling it-

Solving a problem in practical arithmetic

Translating from one language into another-

Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting,

praying." (PI, Sec. 23)

According to Wittgenstein "description" means different things in different contexts. There is no common characteristic which all descriptive expressions share. In his own words:

"Think how many different kinds of things are called "description": Description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates description of a facial expression, description of a sensation of touch, of a mood". (PI, Sec. 24)

Wittgenstein wants to make us understand that words and sentences are used in a wide variety of ways and it is simply impossible to classify them grammatically in a way which can help us to know their functions. There is no apriori road from grammar to the functions of words and sentences. Our language is intermixed with our behaviour and therefore, it is as wide in its tasks as our needs.

According to Strawson:³ It would be absurd to speak of different sentences here, let alone of different kinds of sentences. We might speak of different uses of the sentences, though it would be better to speak of different linguistic activities in each of which the sentence occurred.

Actually Wittgenstein means as is evident from the shift from 'kinds of sentence' to 'kinds of use' is that

sentences are used in countless ways. It would not be a deviation to refer to another point, made by Ryle in his article 'Ordinary Language'. He says that we do not speak of the 'use' of sentences only words are used. It is correct to say that "We cannot talk about the functions or uses of words in the same sort of way as we can talk about the functions or uses of sentences."⁴

Everything has an essence, which alone can make it what it is. Giving the example of horse we assume that there is something common to all horses. Unless something is common to all horses, we tend to argue, they could not be members of the same class of animals. It is necessary that there must be something common to all of them which makes them horses.

Giving the example of the term 'game' must refer to some essence which would be its meaning. To say in another way, all general names stand for some characteristics, which are common to all things denoted by them. Wittgenstein has rejected all these claims unreservedly. He says that our tendency to sublime the logic of language makes us see only similarities; differences are just overlooked. This is an important source of the philosophical mistakes.

Wittgenstein tried to impress upon his readers that instead of assuming that there must be something common to all things to which a general term applies, one has to

examine whether they all have it. When this is completed we find that there is no characteristic which is necessarily present in all objects. There is no common essence. According to Wittgenstein in 'games' we find that there is nothing which must be present in every game. We find only similarities.

According to his own analysis consider, for example, the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic-games and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: There must be something common, or they would not be called "games" but look and see whether there is anything common to all for if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think but look! Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships.

Now for example card-games, here we find many correspondences with the first-group, but many common features drop out and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained but much is lost. Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players?

For example, think of patience. In ball-games there is winning and losing but when a child throws his ball at

the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared.

According to Wittgenstein (PI, Sec.66) we see a complicated net work of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

In the opinion of Wittgenstein, although things have no common essence, they have "family resemblances". Games, the performances under discussion here, form a family. We use a term for a number of things not because they have some essence in common but because they have certain similarities. In this way, Wittgenstein exposes the traditional theories about things and destroys them completely.

The general notion of the use of something is not so simple as it might appear to be. There are, for example, what might be called various different aspects of the use of a thing and what these aspects are will vary with the kind of thing in question. In the use of a hammer, for example, there are at least the following aspects, which form a different group from the previous one: what it is used in (e.g. in salad dressings) and what it is used for (e.g.; for frying).

Words are used as the materials of most of our speaking and writing. It is words which we most often utter and write, when we utter or write something, just as it is

foodstuffs that we most often use as materials when we cook.

A more significant aspect, for us, of the use of words has to do, with the grammar of the word in question with the kind of linguistic context in which the word can and cannot occur. For example, in the frame 'I slept in a bed last night' the blanks can be filled with certain words without linguistic oddity, whereas if they are filled with other words or even the same words in reverse order, the result is linguistically odd. In this way, words 'big comfortable' or 'very short' are suitable to fill the blanks but not 'drink rum' nor 'short very', nor even though to a lesser extent, 'comfortable big'. Knowing how to use a word in this aspect of its use, includes knowing in what sort of linguistic contexts or frames the word can and cannot occur without grammatical oddity, or, to put it more actively, knowing how to construct grammatically correct word-groups (e.g., sentences) which contain that word and being able to recognize grammatically incorrect word-groups (e.g., sentences) which contain that word and being able to recognize grammatically incorrect word-groups which contain it. Let us call this the grammatical aspect of the use of words.

Words are also used to do certain things, to perform certain linguistic jobs. It is this aspect which is meant when one says that the sentence 'Get out!' is normally used

to issue an order, the sentence 'Is he'? is normally used to ask a question and the sentence 'He is' is normally used to state something. When we speak of the use of words in this way, we mean that words are used to perform certain speech acts (such as issuing orders, asking questions, and so on); hence, let us call this the speech-act aspect of the use of words.

Words are also used to do certain things, to perform certain linguistic jobs: It is this aspect which is meant when one says that the sentence 'Get out!' is normally used to issue an order, the sentence 'Is he' is normally used to ask a question and the sentence 'He is' is normally used to state something. When we speak of the use of words in this way, we mean that words are used to perform certain speech acts (such as issuing orders, asking questions and so on); hence, let us call this the speech-act aspect of the use of words.

It must not be supposed that the grammarians' rough classification of the grammatical moods of sentences corresponds in any easy, straightforward way to the various kinds of speech acts; that, for example, declarative sentences are always used to state something, that interrogative sentences are always used to ask questions, that imperative sentences are always used to issue orders and so on. It would be a mistake to give into our craving

for unity in this way; for while the number of possible grammatical moods is small, the number of possible speech acts is very great indeed and sentences of the same grammatical mood can be used to perform many different speech acts. Giving the example of declarative sentences, there is some truth in the claim that they are commonly used to "state that something is the case" or to "state something".

But the following, two points must be kept in the mind. (1) 'Stating something' is a highly general, abstract term with little content. It covers a multitude of more specific speech acts which are all different and which may be performed when one uses a declarative sentence e.g.; describing something, identifying something, commenting on something, reporting what one sees (hears, feels and so on), pointing out something to someone and so on. (2) Declarative sentences are very often used to perform speech acts which are not species of stating something at all: to issue commands (captain of a ship to one of his subordinates: "You will see that the job is finished by six o'clock tonight"), to request something ("I would like to see the manager"), to swear ("I'll be damned") to recommend things ("I think this is the one you should buy"), to express emotion ("I wish I were dead!"), to make promises ("I promise to meet you there") and to do any number of other things as well.

According to Austin⁵ there are two acts illocutionary acts (speech acts performed in saying something) and the later perlocutionary acts (speech acts performed by saying something). Examples of illocutionary acts are such speech acts as describing something, issuing an order, asking a question, greeting someone, announcing an intention, making a promise, and so on. They are illocutionary acts because, in order to perform them successfully, one need only say certain words in the appropriate circumstances; there is no need that the saying of the words should produce some effect in the hearer or anywhere else. Given the appropriate conditions, to say "Get out"! is to issue an order, 'to say "It is an impresionistic painting mainly in greens and blues" is to describe something to say "where did John go?" is to ask a question and so on. Examples of perlocutionary acts are such speech acts as persuading someone to do something, upsetting someone, pleasing someone, cheering someone up, confusing someone, shocking someone, amusing someone and so on. To perform one of these speech acts, it is not enough that certain words be spoken, in addition, some effect must be produced. For example, if you want to perform the speech act of pleasing your wife, you may say to her "you look lovely in that white dress". In saying this, you are complimenting her (illocutionary act), with the intention of pleasing her. But your intention will not be

realized and you will hence not succeed in performing the speech act of pleasing her, unless your words actually do please her that is, unless they have that effect. In this way, pleasing someone is not an illocutionary but a perlocutionary speech act. (Whether or not a perlocutionary act can only be performed by means of the performance of an illocutionary act is but one of the innumerable questions which we can not try to answer here).

The distinction between speech acts and speech activities is only a very loose one. Most words or phrases that designate speech activities e.g., describing something', 'giving a report' can also designate speech acts; descriptions can be made and reports given in a single sentence, in which case describing and giving the report are speech acts, not speech activities.

G. Pitcher says that individual words and phrases regularly occur in certain linguistic frames, that word-groups are normally but together in certain ways and not in others. There is another important aspect of the use of words that is concerned not with the 'immediate linguistic frame of individual words or phrases but rather with the wider conditions both linguistic and non-linguistic in which word-groups (including whole sentences and individual words) and even morphemes are normally used. It is the semantic aspect of the use of

words.

According to Wittgenstein one cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that.

Wittgenstein has practically no interest in purely grammatical considerations. Indeed, we know from our discussion of the sources of philosophical puzzlement that Wittgenstein considered the grammatical behaviour of words and the grammatical structure of sentences to be among the main things that lead the philosopher astray. It could, Pitcher thinks, be argued with justice that it is mainly those with a superficial knowledge of grammar that are led into confusion by it and that a more careful and detailed attention to grammar would help show them the error of their ways. But Wittgenstein's, attitude seems rather to be: Grammar is dangerous, so avoid it!

G. Pitcher says that we must not be misled by the following passage, which seems on the face of it to contradict what is said above:

"Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away".(PI, Sect. 90).

Actually, Wittgenstein is not using the term 'grammatical' in the restricted sense it normally has, he is using it in an extremely broad sense, to mean simply

of two elements, the name-relation and the pictorial nature of the proposition. It was this, among other things that led to the development of the theory of meaning as use and the exploration of the notion of language-games. As we have seen, he came to believe that a name functions as a name only in the context of a system of linguistic and non-linguistic activities to explain in detail how this was so was not some thing that could be left to the psychologist, the description of language-games was one of the main tasks of the philosopher.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had quoted Frege: only in the context of a proposition does a name have reference (TLP.3.3.). In the Bemerkungen this is glossed in an interesting manner: it is like saying, he says, that it is only in use that a rod is a lever (PB 59). This is one of the earliest appearances of the comparison between words and tools which as we have seen plays a dominant part in Wittgenstein's later thought. His first employment of the metaphor of a game appears in a conversation at Schlick's house in June 1930 in a discussion of formalism in mathematics. The passage is striking and deserves quoting at length⁷:

"Formalism contains both truth and falsehood. The truth in formalism is that every syntax can be regarded as a system of rules for a game. I have been reflecting on what

'Weyl' can mean when he says that a formalist regards the axioms of mathematics as similar to the rules of chess. I would like to say: not only the axioms of mathematics but the whole of syntax is arbitrary.

I was asked in Cambridge whether I think that mathematics concerns ink marks on paper. I reply: in just the same sense in which chess concerns wooden figures. Chess, I mean, does not consist in my pushing wooden figures around a board. If I say 'now I will make myself a queen with very frightening eyes, she will drive everyone off the board' you will laugh. It does not matter what a pawn looks like. What is much rather the case is that the totality of rules of the game determines the logical place of a pawn. A pawn is a variable like the 'X' in logic.....

If you ask me where lies the difference between chess and the syntax of a language I reply: solely in their application.....If there were men on Mars who made war like the chess pieces, then the generals would use the rules of chess for prediction. It would then be a scientific question whether the king could be mated by a certain deployment of pieces in three moves and so on".(WWk 104).

The comparison between an axiomatic system and a game of chess is repeated and developed several times in the conversations with Waismann (WWK 163, 170), and it is noted that it was anticipated in Frege's Grundgesetze der

Arithmetik (wwk 150-51). But there is no general notion of language-game; and indeed the study of language-games is not so much the study of a game-like calculus as a study of the ways in which such a calculus can be applied. Nor, so far, is there any reflection on the differences between different games: Chess with its strict formal rules is always taken as the example.

The Bemerkungen is silent about language-games, but in the Philosophische Grammatik a whole chapter is devoted to exploring the analogies between arithmetic and chess and in particular to examining the role of truth and false-hood in arithmetic and winning and losing in a game (PG 289-95). This treatment is more sophisticated but less picturesque than the one in the conversations with Waismann (cf. PG 294). But the more interesting development in the Grammatik is the application of the game-analogy to non-mathematical uses of language.

It is the realization of the variety among games which makes the concept of game a particularly useful one for Wittgenstein to express his new insights into the diversity of linguistic usages. The comparison between language and chess is exploited for several purposes (PG 49f) but Wittgenstein is now very conscious that chess, with its precise rules is not typical of all games and that other less rule-bound games may serve as objects of comparison for

languages.

I said that the meaning of a word is the role which it plays in the calculus of language. (I compared it to a piece in chess). Let us think now of the way in which calculation takes place with a word, the word 'red' for example. The locality of the colour is given, the form and size are specified of the spot or body which has the colour, we are told whether it is lighter or darker, whether it is constant or changing and so on. Conclusions are drawn from the propositions, they are translated into illustrations and behaviour, there is drawing, measurement and computation. But let us think also of the meaning of the word 'oh!' If we were asked about it, we would probably say 'oh!' is a sigh, we say, for instance, 'oh!' it is raining again already' and similar things. In that way we would have described the use of the word. But now what corresponds to the calculus, to the complicated game which we play with other words? In the use of the words 'oh' or 'hurrah' or 'hm' there is nothing comparable⁸. (PG.67).

In this passage we can see Wittgenstein passing from his once forward expression 'calculus' to the new favourite 'game'. The coinage 'Language-Game' itself has one of its earliest uses on page 62 of the 'Philosophische Grammatik' in the course of a discussion of ostensive definition. When children learn the meanings of words by being shown objects

and hearing their names pronounced it is doubtful, he says, whether this is properly called 'explanation'.

The language-game (sparachspiel) is still very simple and the ostensive explanation plays a different role in it from the one it plays in more developed language-games. (The child cannot, for instance, ask 'what is that'?) But there is no clear boundary between primitive forms and more complicated ones. I would not know what I can still call 'explanation' and what I cannot. I can only describe language-games or calculuses. Whether they can still be called calculuses is indifferent, as long as we do not allow ourselves to be diverted by the use of a general term from the investigation of every individual case that we want to decide⁹. (PG 62, cf, PII, 27, BB 82).

The stress on the examination of individual case is renewed when Wittgenstein emphasizes that 'game' or rather the even broader German word 'spiel' is an analogous term. There is no characteristic that is common to everything that we call games but we cannot on the other hand say that 'game' has several independent meanings like 'bank'. It is a family-likeness term (PG 75,118). Think of ball-games alone; some like tennis, have a complicated system of rules, but there is a game which consists just in throwing the ball as high as one can, or the game which children play of throwing a ball and running after it. Some games are competitive,

others not. This thought was developed in a famous passage of the 'Philosophical Investigations' in which Wittgenstein denied that there was any feature—such as entertainment, competitiveness, rule-guidedness, skill— which formed a common element in all games, instead we find a complicated net-work of similarities and relationships overlapping and criss-crossing. The concept of 'game' is extended as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. What ties the ship to the wharf is a rope, and the rope consists of fibres but it does not get its strength from any fibre which runs through it from one end to the other but from the fact that there is a vast number of fibres overlapping' (PII, 65-7, BB87).

This feature of 'game' is one which Wittgenstein believed it shared with 'language' and this made it particularly appropriate to call particular mini-languages 'language-games'. There were others. Most importantly, even though not all games have rules, the function of rules in many games has similarities with the function of rules in language (PG 63, 77).

Language-games, like games, need have no external goal, they can be autonomous activities (PG 184; Z 320). But the comparison of language to a game was not meant to suggest that language was a pastime or something trivial: on the contrary, it was meant to bring out the connection

between the speaking of language and non-linguistic activities. Indeed the speaking of language is part of a communal activity, a way of living in society which Wittgenstein calls a 'form of life' (PII,23). It is through sharing in the playing of language-games that language is connected with our life.(PG 65).

At the end of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had said that the right method of philosophy, consisted in showing the metaphysician that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions (TLP 6.53). He did not then say how this was to be done: now it is to be done by showing him that he is using a word outside the language-game that is its home (PII,116). Even the simplest sign, such as a name, is a name only in a language-game, the meaning of a sign is precisely its role in such a game (PII, 49,261;PG 130).

The most common form of Philosophical nonsense arises not when a word is being used outside any language-game at all, but when it is used in a language-game other than the one appropriate to it (often the language-game misleadingly suggested by its surface grammar) (PG 126). So it is clearly important to be able to know where one language-game ends and another beings. How does one do this? Wittgenstein gives us little help here. Consistently with his general position, he does not give any general account of what a language-game

is nor a criterion of individuation for language-games. He merely makes some general remarks about language-games and otherwise illuminates the concept principally by giving a fund of examples. The most systematic treatment of language games comes in the Brown Book in which a large number are described or invented and applied to the treatment of traditional metaphysical problems about the nature of modality and time as well as the notions of language and guidance by rules. But from that book one could not derive a principle which would enable one to detect what constitutes an illegitimate crossing between games (cf. RFM 50).

The fullest list of language-games given by Wittgenstein is in the Philosophical Investigations-I, 23. It includes obeying and giving orders, describing the appearance of objects, giving measurements, constructing an object from a description, reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, presenting the results of experiments in tables and diagrams, making up stories, acting plays, singing catches, guessing riddles, telling jokes, translating from one language into another, asking thanking, cursing, greeting and praying. Elsewhere in the Investigations he gives as examples of language-games: the expression of sensation (I, 288), the reporting of past wishes (I, 654), the description of physical objects and the description of sense-impressions (II, 180), ostensive

definition (I,27 CF, BB83), the subsequent explanation of one's meaning (II,217). We hear of 'the language-game with the word 'game' (PII,71) and 'the language-game' "I mean this". (PI II, 217). Language games are invented by Wittgenstein as models for philosophical theories e.g. for Plato's account of naming in the Theaetetus (PII, 48, 60, 64) and for Russell's theory of descriptions as used in the Tractatus (PII, 60). Wittgenstein contrasts what he said in the Tractatus about the structure of language with the multiplicity of different language-games. How many kinds of sentences are there? say assertion. Question and command? There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all: but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence and others become obsolete and forgotten. (PII, 23). We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the every-day language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike (PI II,224).

It is clear that with this variety of things called 'language-games' we have come some distance from 'the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words', as language-games were defined in the Blue Book (BB 17). It is no longer true, as Wittgenstein then said, that the study

of language-games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive language.' It has come to mean the study of any form of use of language against a background context of a form of life.

There seems to be an inconsistency in the passage quoted from section 23 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein says that there are countless kinds of sentence: countless different kinds of use of what we call sentences. The first half of that dictum suggests that two uses make two different kinds of sentence. The second half suggests that one kind of sentence may have more than one use. The second suggestion may well seem happier than the first. No doubt the use of 'come here' to give an order and to make a request are different uses: but this seems no sufficient reason to say that two different kinds of sentence are involved. It may well be thought clearer and more natural to reserve the distinction between types of sentence for those broad distinctions between types of use which are marked in the syntax of the sentence (e.g. the distinction between imperative and indicating mood).

Wittgenstein would reply that this involves paying too much attention to the surface grammar and not enough to the depth grammar so revealed in the study of the language-game. None the less, it seems that the traditional distinction between assertion, question and command is on a

different level from the other distinctions drawn by Wittgenstein. It is clear, for instance, that these different kinds of sentence could occur inside or outside a joke or a fairy-tale; so that the distinction between them cuts across the distinction between fiction and non-fiction. Wittgenstein is surely right that it is futile to try to assimilate questions to statements (e.g. statements of ignorance, or of desire for information) (PII, 24). But this type of distinction is quite different from the type of distinction drawn if we are to speak of the language-game with a particular word (like 'game') or of the language-game of measurement. For it is clear that the word 'game' or a set of measurements could occur in a command, an assertion or a question.

The point on which Wittgenstein would insist is that it is misleading to lump together all indicative sentences - such as 'The bone is in the cupboard', 'she is asleep', 'she is dreaming'. I am in pain', 'I am thinking of my father' - as belonging to the class of assertions. One must pay attention to the differences in the use of these sentences - e.g. what sorts of mistake or doubt are possible in connection with them, whether or how we find out whether they are true and this is what makes up the language-game.

There are two related difficulties in understanding what Wittgenstein means by 'the use' of an expression.

First, does 'use' mean 'usage' or 'utility'? Does a word have a use provided that it can fit into acceptable sentences or does its use have to make some difference in the world? Wittgenstein's two favourite similies point in opposite directions. A game, like chess, has only syntactical rules, what goes on in chess has no effect on the world except indirect through the consequences of winning and losing. On the other hand, tools are instruments for operating on the world and altering it in various ways. Secondly, is the theory of meaning as use to be applied primarily to words or to whole sentences? Here words seem unlike tools, because tools work on the world in isolation, whereas in general we have to put words together into sentences to affect the world in any way: it looks as if it would be a more helpful metaphor to say that in our language we have a kit for assembling tools rather than a tool bag. It is the complete sentence that seems to be the more in the game. (PG 39). Sentences are made rather than used, once one has got beyond the phrase-book stage of learning a language.

To this Wittgenstein's reply would be that one gives the use of a piece of language by describing its role in a language-game and that a language-game is a more or less complicated sharable human activity which might or might not, have a utility which could be grasped and stated outside the game. Language cannot be looked on, as a whole,

as a means to some extra-linguistic end - the communication of thought cannot be regarded as such an end, because there are so many thoughts which cannot even be thought without language.

We do not generally think or use language because we have found that it pays to do so - any more than we bring up our children because we have found that it pays to do so. But of course particular language games (e.g. the making of calculations when building boilers) have been found to pay off. But even in these cases, Wittgenstein thinks it would be misleading to regard calculation as a means chosen to an end (PG 109; PII 4668).

As for the distinction between words and sentences, this is a distinction which itself presupposes the existence of fairly complicated language-games and does not arise in the case of simple games like that of the builders with their, building-stones (PII, 18-19). The concept 'sentence' has not the sharp boundary this objection presupposes (PG 112) of course, we can draw a sharp boundary if we wish in the same way as a pace can be standardized as 75 cm. but that does not mean that the non-standardized concept is unusable (PG 113; PII, 69).

According to Wittgenstein¹⁰ in the Blue Book: If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood of the

agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing back-ground of highly complicated processes of thought (BB 17).

But In the Philosophical Investigations he warned: Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language - as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. (PII,130).

It does not greatly matter, he might say, whether the builders game is rightly called a language, it has similarities with language and there is no clear break between these primitive games and more complicated ones; the more complicated ones can be built up from the primitive ones by the gradual addition of new forms (BB 17).

One crucial point of comparison between language and games is that both involve the employment of rules. This must not be misunderstood. We do not in general use language according to strict rules-we commonly don't think of rules of usage while talking and we usually cannot produce any

without prejudice and look at the way words are actually used, the mystery of meaning will evaporate.

In his later works Wittgenstein replaces the picture theory of meaning by the tool theory of language. "Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments." "The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects". It is, therefore, important to look at the different functions that the words are used to perform. What misleads us is the grammatical similarity. "What confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy"¹²

To say, "every word in language signifies something" is to say nothing whatever, unless we also explain what exact distinction we wish to make. It is like saying "all tools serve to modify something". Do we know anything about the functions of tools by this statement? Naming is not the essence of language. It is merely attaching labels to things, language is like an ancient city which has both old and new houses without any uniform planning. Language is woven with all human activities. To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.

When we fail to bear these points in mind which usually happens while doing philosophy we get our

understanding tied up in knots, we suffer brain cramps. We are trapped by grammatical similarities which prevent us from seeing differences of functions. The only cure is to look at the actual use of words. Once we "command a clear view" of the uses of a word, our philosophical problems are solved. Philosophical problems arise when philosophy interferes with the actual use of words. The proper business of philosophy is only to describe it.

According to Wittgenstein¹³, "The meaning of a word is its use in the language". He discusses this point throughout the Philosophical Investigations. According to him in (PI, Sec. I). But what is the meaning of the word "five"? No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.

Wittgenstein says in PI, Sec. 7: I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language game". In point of fact a language-game is a use of language for some purpose. Language is not something artificially constructed for the use of philosophers, language is rather an instrument. That is to say, speaking a language and understanding it is a matter of being "able to do a variety of things, to act or behave in certain ways and to do so under the appropriate conditions".

In this way, speaking a language is engaging in certain modes of behaviour. It is to engage in "forms of life" and "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life". Words are not only like games, we actually play games with them. Words are pieces used in various language games. The meaning of a word is determined by its roles in the various language-games in which it occurs, the kind of behaviour in which its use is embedded.

According to Wittgenstein when philosophers use a word "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home!

"What we do is to bring words from their metaphysical to their everyday use". (P.I., Sect. 116)

....."philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday?" (PI, Sec. 38).

"The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work." (PI, Sec. 132).

Wittgenstein's purpose in insisting on the use of a word is to destroy the myth that its role in language is determined by strict logical rules. To destroy this myth, he discusses the role of rules in language. David Pole commenting on the analogy of game says, "It serves him first

in that a game is usually a form of social activity in which different players fill different roles, secondly in that games observe rules". And further¹⁴,

"A language.....is a pattern of activities governed by rules".¹⁵

"Grammar, in Wittgenstein's sense, is the structure of language or seen differently, its system of rules".

"Broadly the thesis is that a language, like a mathematical system, consists of a complex set of procedures which may also be appealed to as rules".

"We are to think of two factors in language, on the one hand particular moves or practices which are assessed by appeal to the rules and on the other hand those rules themselves. Beyond these there is no further appeal, they are things we merely accept or adopt".

All these passages are selected from Pole's book tend to read some thing which Wittgenstein never holds in his later works. Stanley Cavel says that Pole's account of Wittgenstein's views is not merely wrong but misses the fact that Wittgenstein's ideas form a sustained and radical criticism of such views.

It seems that Pole wants to suggest that rules are the highest court of appeal to determine the correctness or incorrectness of the use of language.

Wittgenstein maintained in the Tractatus that

language is impossible without exact logical forms. He conceived languages, there, on the model of a calculus with fixed rules. But the important aim of the later Wittgenstein is to demolish this artificial notion of language.

Wittgenstein says about game that "It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules....." He says that if we cannot give boundaries, it does not amount to ignorance." we do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. It is possible to draw a boundary for a sepcial purpose. But it does not make the concept usable except for that special purpose.What is important is the context.

"Following a rule" is itself an activity which is learnt against the background of innumerable other activities. The concept of rule does not exhaust the concept of correctness or justification. A rule itself can be misinterpreted¹⁷.According to Wittgenstein in the more strict sense rules do not "determine" what a game (or use) is, we do not explain what playing a game is a part of our natural history. We can learn a game without formulating its rules. Even where there are explicit rules "it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game may have very different roles in the game." Finally, the most important point behind the analogy of game is to destroy the myth that there is a set of characteristics which every game shares. There is no set of characteristics determined by rules,

language has no essence.

According to Wittgenstein¹⁸, "following a rule" is as much dependent on "practice" as "playing a game" is. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule." To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are customs (uses, institutions). That means, rules are not enough. It must be possible to know whether a particular rule is obeyed or infringed. And this is possible by looking at the actual cases.

According to Wittgenstein, 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the something as obeying it.(PI, Sec.202).

According to Wittgenstein the man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law (rules) in the way a word is used and trying to apply this law consistently comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results.(BB, P.27).

There are some objections against Wittgenstein's view that he identifies the meaning of a word with its uses in language. (1) In non-linguistic areas things which have uses(e.g., tools, instruments) normally can not be said to have meanings. And things which sometimes mean something

(e.g., black clouds on the horizon, foot prints in the snow,¹⁵ the rising pitch of someone's voice) do not, except rarely, have uses. (2) Similarly in language, the connections between meaning and use do not hold universally, much less necessarily. It is quite possible to know the meaning of a word and yet not know its use and to know the use without knowing the meaning. (3) There is always more meaning in an expression than we have given it.

On these grounds Pitcher and Pole accept that meaning cannot be identified with use. But they draw different conclusions. Pole has charged the 'conservatism' against Wittgenstein's conception of the philosophical activity. According to Pitcher¹⁹, he does not think that Wittgenstein's mistake here, if it is one, has any very serious consequences for his philosophy.

Pitcher tried to show that in the non-linguistic areas, things which have uses can not be said to have meaning and things which are said to mean something have no use. In the first place, "Wittgenstein is concerned with language, not with the alleged meaning and use of things in non-linguistic areas. 'Use' and 'meaning' are not normally used in the same sense in language in which these terms are used in non-linguistic areas.

But in language, leaving some exceptions, expressions

have both meaning and use. It means, if a word has both meaning and use, none can claim to have understood its meaning in the full sense of the term, unless he knows how to use that word in different language games which are played with it. In this way, there is a necessary relation between meaning and use in language which is lacking in non-linguistic areas.

Again, Pitcher criticised the identification of meaning and use by pointing out that 'It is possible to know the meaning of a word and yet not know its use and to know the use without knowing the meaning'. For example, a non-latin speaker may know that 'ultus' means revenge in latin but he may not know when or how to use it. We may take an example of the latter: most people know how to use the sign Q.E.D. yet far fewer know its meaning. It seems that Pitcher is saying something which Wittgenstein would never wish to reject. One may know the dictionary meaning of a word without knowing its use. Similarly, one may somehow learn a particular use of an expression without understanding its meaning. But it does not follow from these facts that anyone can claim to know the meaning of a word without knowing its uses in the language, i.e., the language-games played with it, nor is it plausible to maintain that one can use an expression without knowing its meaning in some sense. If a word has both meaning and use,

one can claim to know the word fully only if he knows both of them. Pitcher mixed this point because he has selected as his examples non-English expressions.

The important thing is not the question whether it is possible to know the meaning of a word without knowing its uses or the uses without knowing its meaning. The important thing is that whether the meaning of a word can be determined independently of its uses in language. In this way, it is the relation of the meaning and uses of a word with which Wittgenstein is concerned.

According to Wittgenstein in the 'Tractatus' a picture in itself says nothing, it is rather made to represent something. Words in themselves are merely dead signs'. Therefore, there must be something in addition to linguistic expressions, it is argued which can give them meaning. The speaker intends his words to mean something. In this way, meaning is a mental activity. There must be some thought behind the words, he must, it is said, understand them--some process must occur in his mind. He must grasp the thought behind the language. He must be able to understand the intended meaning. For example, when a person is given an order, we say that he must understand it before he can carry it out. In other words a mental act or process of understanding must occur in his mind prior to his overt activity.

Wittgenstein says: "But is n't it our meaning it that gives sense to the sentence? (And here, of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless series of words). And 'meaning it' is some-thing in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private! It is the intangible something only comparable to consciousness itself".(PI,Sec.358).

Again in BB, p.148, Wittgenstein asks to consider the following examples: "Think before you speak!", "He speaks without thinking", "What I said did n't quite express my thought", "He says one thing and thinks just the opposite", "I did not mean a word of what I said", The French language uses its words in that order in which we think them.(BB,P.148).

These are only extra ordinary circumstances in which meaning may appear to be different from saying. In normal situations this possibility does not arise. Secondly, this distinction between saying and meaning arises only where a speaker is said to mean something. It is absurd to claim that an expression says something and means something else. Wittgenstein would say that these are only special uses of the mental words. If we examine the logic of these expressions we can see clearly that they do not designate inner processes which may be said to accompany them. for example, "He speaks without thinking,"

Wittgenstein maintained that the mental words such as 'thinking' and 'meaning' do not designate any inner process. If there were inner processes running along concurrently with the physical processes of speaking, we should be able to recognise and identify these alleged processes by introspection. But we fail to trace anything like that.

Now I give the example of reading. Suppose a specific mental process, the reading process, MRP is present in the mind when we are reading. The MRP is present in the mind when we are reading. The MRP would then be our object of analysis of reading as its presence makes our overt behaviour a manifestation of reading. Wittgenstein tries to show that there is no unique mental process present in every case of reading, secondly, that MRP does not enable us to explain how mental words are meaningful. An empirical investigation into the use of the word 'reading' shows that there is not a mental content which is always present when a person is reading and therefore, the criterion for a person's reading cannot consist in pointing out a particular mental content. The same is true of all other psychological words. Their job is not to name or describe certain inner processes. Wittgenstein analyses brilliantly the idea of a special atmosphere or feeling accompanying each particular word.

According to Wittgenstein sometimes a mental content

does occur. But none of such experience ever constitutes a person's act of meaning. It is the nature and context of the circumstance in which he speaks that is important.

Wittgenstein maintained that no bridge from words to the world can be built on the basis of mental images. There is no effective reply to third man' argument here. It is not the occurrence of an image but its use that gives it any significance. What a particular image says depends on how it is used not on its occurrence. Its use in its turn, depends on how the expression for it is used in various language-games. In this way, an image is not necessary element in the meaning of a word. According to Wittgenstein in PI, p.217 if God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.

Summarisingly, it can be said that Wittgenstein has tried to show with extraordinary brilliance that generally there is no mental content designated by mental words and that even in the situations where a mental content seems to be present, the meaning of a word is not determined by its occurrence. What gives meaning and life to words and sentences is their use in language and life.

According to him²⁰ what is happening now has significance in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance.

In short, I can say that Wittgenstein got the success

in showing that a person's understanding something is not a process that occurs in his mind. It consists rather in the use that he makes of it. And only his actual performance shows that he has understood it correctly.

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5. This is debatable, however, Austin claims that an illocutionary act will not be "happily" or successfully performed unless a certain minimal effect is achieved on the nearer-namely, his hearing the words and understanding their meaning and force. I can not, he says, be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. (Austin, op. Cit, p.115). If Austin's claim be admitted, a slight reformulation of the way I have drawn the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts would be

required, but this could easily be done.

6. Philosophical Investigations, Sect.664.
7. WWK, 104
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CHAPTER - V

PRIVATE LANGUAGE

Wittgenstein's theory of language games elucidates the philosophical problems. One area, where it's contribution is most significant, is the sphere of our knowledge of ourselves and other minds. Wittgenstein rejects the traditional theories of mental concepts by examining the possibility of a private language (a private language-game).

What is a private language, we may wonder, and why does it's possibility matter? A private language, in the sense discussed by Wittgenstein, is a language whose words "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking: to his immediate private sensations"¹. Whether such a language is possible has philosophical importance not so much as a question in its own right as because of its consequences for epistemology and philosophy of mind.

It is entailed by several traditional and influential philosophical theories that a private language is possible, consequently, if private languages are impossible those theories are false. For instance, some empiricist philosophers have thought that the only matters of fact we really know are our own experiences; what we claim to know about the world or about other people is based on our knowledge of our own mental states and processes. The same philosophers have commonly taken for granted that our

knowledge of our experiences can be expressed in language, at least to ourselves and that the possibility of this expression does not presuppose any acquaintance with the external world or other minds. Anyone who accepts this much must believe in the possibility of a private language whose words acquire meaning simply by being linked to private experiences. Indeed he must believe that our actual language is a private language, not in the sense that it is peculiar to a single user, but in the sense that its words have acquired their meaning for each of us by an essentially private process; an internal ostensive definition in which an appropriate sample of experience was attended to and associated with a word.

Ofcourse, if words are thought of as acquiring meaning in this way, a doubt may arise whether the samples from which one person has acquired his vocabulary are really like the samples from which another person has done so. In this way, this form of empiricism carries with it a version of scepticism which finds expression in such thoughts as stated here: "For all we know, what I call "red" you call, "green" and vice versa"². One point of the private language argument is to refute this version of empiricism with its attendant scepticism to show that the thought just expressed is a nonsensical one and that the doubts it conjures up are spurious. The programmes of the private

language argument can be well summed up in a quotation from the Tractatus 'scepticism is not irrefutable but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt only can exist where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists and an answer only where something can be said'. (T.L.P. 6.51). The 'Investigations' shows that the empiricist sceptic must use a private language in order to formulate his question but in a private language nothing can be said and so no questions can be asked.

Wittgenstein considered that the notion of a private language rested on two fundamental mistakes, one about the nature of experience and the other about the nature of language. The mistake about experience was the belief that experience is private, the mistake about language was the belief that experience is private, the mistake about language was the belief that words can acquire meaning by bare ostensive definition. The mistake about language has already been considered. We have seen how Wittgenstein argued against the primacy of ostensive definition against the idea that bare ostension without training in the use of words could constitute the teaching of a language. His arguments concern public ostensive definition as well as private ostensive definition: 'they apply to the naming of shapes and colours and men as well as to the naming of pains

and moods'.

But if the arguments are accepted then the private language theory is refuted before it is stated: 'at least if it supposes the meanings of names for sensations could be learnt simply by acquaintance with the names' bearers, i.e. simply by having and attending to the sensations'. However, a defender of private languages might suggest the possibility of a language which was private in that its words referred to private sensations without necessarily being private in that its words were learnt from private sensations by bare ostension. A private language he might maintain, might be learnt from private sensations not by bare ostension but by some analogue of training in the use of words. This suggestion shows that the critique of the primacy of ostensive definition does not render superfluous the later explicit discussion of private languages.

What that later discussion does, in effect, is to show that in the case of the private ostensive definition there cannot be any analogue of the background which is necessary if the public ostensive definition is to convey meaning.

Wittgenstein¹ (PII,243) says to imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods and the rest-for his private use? - well, can't we do so in our ordinary

language? But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.

Having defined a private language as a language whose words refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. Wittgenstein goes on to comment on the expressions occurring in this definition and first of all on the expression 'refer to'. In section 244 he asks, 'How do words refer to sensations? In this passage he appears to have no objection to calling 'pain' the name of a sensation or to calling 'I am in pain' a proposition. We talk about sensations every day' he says and gives them names' and he asks, 'How does a human learn the meaning of the names of sensations? As one possible answer to this question he suggests that words replace the natural preverbal expression of sensation. A child has hurt himself and he cries and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later, sentences'. (PII, 244).

According to Wittgenstein³ if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (PII, 293). This seems to suggest that we should not so construe the grammar, i.e. should not consider a sensation word like 'pain' as the name of an object. In the Zettel

Wittgenstein's wayward self says, ' 'Joy' severely designates an inward thing and his sterner self replies 'No'. 'Joy' designates nothing. Neither any inward nor any outward thing'.

These passages can be reconciled in the light of the attack on the primacy of ostensive definition. The model of object and name which we are to reject is the idea that a speaker understands a name by being acquainted with its bearer. This is clear from the context: at PII, 293. Wittgenstein is criticising the theory that one knows what pain is only from one's own case. That theory is one formulation of the idea that it is acquaintance which conveys meaning: it is only one's own pain that one is acquainted with, so it is only from one's own case that one knows what pain is. If this were true, and each man knew what pain was only from his own case, then none could teach anyone else the meaning of the word 'pain'; each speaker would have to name the sensation for himself by a private ostensive definition.

According to Wittgenstein what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'? - How has he done this naming of pain? And whatever he did, what was its purpose? When one says, 'He gave a name to his sensation', one forgets that a great deal of stage setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we

speak of someone's having given a name to 'pain' what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word 'pain', it shows the post where the new word is stationed.

This echoes the remarks about public ostensive definition: 'The ostensive definition explains the use - the meaning of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear'. (PII,30). Wittgenstein is not denying that one can give a name to a sensation, he is merely affirming that giving a name presupposes stage-setting. Such stage-setting, he will go on to argue, is possible in a public language, but not a private language. Given the stage-setting, the word for a sensation may be ostensively defined no less than the name of a colour or a piece of furniture.

To sum up: if by 'name' one means 'word whose meaning is learnt by bare ostensive definition', then 'pain' is not the name of a sensation; but if by 'name' one means what is ordinarily meant by that word then ofcourse 'pain' is the name 'of a sensation'.

If the word 'pain' does not refer to a sensation by being attached to it by bare ostensive definition, how does it refer? In what way is it connected with the sensation? One possibility, Wittgenstein says, is that it is a learnt, articulate replacement of unlearned, inarticulate expressions of sensation such as moans and winces. The word 'pain'

cannot, as it were, hook on to pain directly; it must be attached to pain through its connections with the natural expressions of pain. To try to connect 'pain' with pain in isolation from unlearned pain-behaviour would be to try to insert language between pain and its expression. This Wittgenstein thinks, is absurd: presumably because the verbal manifestation of pain is itself an expression of pain (PII, 245).

The view (say, view P) which Wittgenstein criticised throughout his later works may be briefly put as follows:

1. Sensations are private, none can have my pains.
2. Sensation-words are commonly used to name and/or describe private contents of consciousness.
3. The meaning of a sensation-word, like other words is the thing it refers to, namely, a sensation.
4. Only I can know that I have a sensation: it is the bearer and bearer alone who can claim to have full understanding of the sensation-expressions which he uses to describe his sensations.

Now, I am examining certain absurd consequences which follow from the view P. The view P holds that while I am absolutely certain that I am in pain, I can never know for certain, whether another person is in pain or not. This is so; because I can not feel another person's pain. I can only guess or believe that someone else is in pain. I can never

know it. But this is absurd in the view of Wittgenstein. If we are using the word 'know' in its standard sense, then other people usually know when I am in pain, as I know when they are. According to Wittgenstein about the privacy of sensations:

"In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain".(PI,Sec.246).

About the certainty of the third-person sensation-expressions he says:

"I can be as certain of someone else's sensations as of any fact".(PI,p.224).

"Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four?"(PI, p.224).

Wittgenstein says that there are real situations in which it makes no sense to doubt whether someone is really in pain:

"Just try - in a real case - to doubt someone else's fear or pain".(PI,Sec.303)

According to Wittgenstein⁴ there are some situations in which I am as certain that another person is in pain as of my pain. It can be said that the other person might be only pretending. According to Wittgenstein there are some situations in which it is quite possible that a person is

pretending but there are some cases that he is not pretending. Giving an example of a man who has met with an accident, he is bleeding and crying. Is it possible to maintain that he might be pretending? An advocate of the view 'P' will hold that even in this case a conceivable doubt does exist - despite the obvious pain - behaviour he may not be feeling the pain-sensation. If you are certain, is it not that you are shutting your eyes in face of doubt? But if I find the man bleeding and crying and I rush to his help then I can not be in doubt. It is only a philosophical theory that makes room for doubt for which there is no other ground. It is the only situation that provides us with the criterion for determining whether a person is really in pain or is only pretending. It is simply irrational to doubt, if there is no positive ground for it. Doubting is a form of life, apart from which it has no significance. Doubting cannot just consist in saying 'I doubt'. There must be something in the situation itself which justifies our doubting. Moreover, whenever we are in doubt, it must affect our attitude and practice. If our attitude and practice are not in conformity with a doubt then the doubt is pointless. To imagine a doubt is not to be in doubt. Doubting has an end. The expression of doubt has no place in the language-game.

Wittgenstein made an interesting observation which

cuts at the root of the linguistic picture that leads us to scepticism about the third-person sensation-expressions. It is wrong to say, he points out that I know that I am in pain. This point is not empirical but grammatical. It is pointless to use the term 'know' for my pain. The verb 'to know' and the adverb 'for certain' are used only in the situations in which it is possible to be mistaken. But there is no possibility of being mistaken when I am in pain. If it is correct to say 'I know that I am in pain' then the following questions put to Wittgenstein must make good sense:

How do you know you are in pain?

Are you sure?

And the following remarks ought to be equally intelligible:

I think I am in pain, but I may be mistaken.

I do not know whether I am in pain or not.

I believe I am in pain.

I seem to be in pain.

I doubt whether I am in pain.

Let me find out if I am in pain.

But all these questions and remarks are out of circulation in our language. These language-games are missing, they are never played. The absurdity of these remarks demonstrates clearly that the terms 'know' and 'certain' or their equivalents cannot be used for the

first-person sensation expressions.

Consequently, the scepticism attached with the third person sensation expressions loses its significance. What Wittgenstein says about thinking can be said about pain also. I do not know that I am in a pain, but I know that the other person is in pain.?

Wittgenstein launched an attack on the view that sensation-word stand for private sensations by examining the possibility of a private language. The view under consideration maintains that sensation-word 'pains', itching, burning etc. get their meanings by designating inner or private sensations.

In other words the meaning of 'pain' and other sensation-words is necessarily tied up with our private sensations. Consequently, the meaning of 'pain' is determined independently of pain behaviour and other publicly observable characteristics of the situation in which pain is used. An obvious conclusion of this view is that each one of us must learn sensation-words only by associating them with corresponding sensations. Such a language, in which 'pain', itch' etc. are learnt privately by associating them with inner contents of consciousness, must be a private language. But a private language is an impossibility.

Wittgenstein makes two observations in this

connection: firstly, a man could not make himself understood when he used these words and secondly, we cannot say that, these words are names of sensations.

The following points will give the whole details:

The first observation is concerned with the unintelligibility of the words which designate private sensations. These words would be unintelligible because none except the user knows with what he has associated them. If by 'pain' I mean nothing but a sensation which I experience only in the privacy of my consciousness then none, can understand me. Similarly, if 'pain' names a sensation which only the experiences can know then I can never understand what it would mean to say that another person is in pain.

Wittgenstein examined the suggestion that I can understand that he is in pain on the supposition that he has just the same experience as I have so often had. But the suggestion gets us no where.

It is like saying: 'You surely know what it is 5 O'clock here means, so you also know what it's 5 O'clock on the sun means. It means simply that it is just the same time here as it is here when it is 5 O'clock'. The explanation by means of identity, says Wittgenstein, does not work here 'I know what it means to say 'the same time' but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same

time here and there. How can I know that the other person has the same pain? Can I say that the stone has the same experience as I have, if one says: "it is in pain"? One can say: pain is pain whether he has it or I have it. But this is explaining away the problem. Similarly Wittgenstein rejects the suggestion that I can imagine someone else's pain on the model of my own pain as getting us nowhere.

I can make the conclusions after the above discussions that Wittgenstein examined the view that sensation-words name private sensation and tried to show that it would lead to the absurd thesis according to which none save the experiences, can understand that he is in pain (or is having other sensations). But Wittgenstein proceeded to show that a private understanding of sensation words is impossible. In other words, a private language is inconceivable. It cannot be maintained that sensation-words are intelligible to the man who is having a sensation, even though they could not be understood by other people.

Now I am stressing on this point what Wittgenstein means by a private language and how it is impossible. It is essential not to confuse the possibility of a private language with either (a) the question whether I can, for my private use, keep a diary in ordinary English to record my pains, moods, feelings etc. or (b) the question whether there could be in fact a language used by only one person

but capable of being understood by any explorer. None will dispute that the answer to the first question: is affirmative and none will mistake it for Wittgenstein's problem. But a controversy between Ayer and Rhees indicates that the question (b) is more difficult to answer and may be confused with the question Wittgenstein has raised. Both Ayer and Rhees show a correct understanding of the problem. Ayer states the problem he is criticising as "that for a person to be able to attach meaning to a sign it is necessary that other people should be capable of understanding it too." In the words of Rhees the main question is a question of whether I can have a private understanding, whether I can understand something which could not be said in a language, which anyone else could understand. In this way both are concerned mainly with the question (b).

Ayer interpreted the problem wrongly and tried to refute a thesis which is different from the question he poses. His arguments are intended to prove, (1) that there can be a language which is and always has been, as a matter of fact, unintelligible to anyone but its speaker and (2) that sensation reports are not of necessity unintelligible to anyone but their maker. Rhees tries to reject Ayers' contention on the ground that a language must consist of rules and there could be nothing to decide whether the

speaker using a private language was following rules. It is disputable whether Rhees has given a satisfactory reply to Ayer but as Garver has pointed out "this controversy should be distinguished from the question they formulated - the question raised by Wittgenstein about private language". By a "private" language is "meant one that not merely is not but cannot be understood by anyone other than the speaker. The reason for this is, as we have already seen, that the words of this language are supposed to "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking". It is supposed that I learn this language by associating words with sensations. I fix my attention on a sensation and establish a connection between a word and the sensation. The philosophical considerations which strengthen the possibility of a 'private' language are: that I know from my own case what the word 'pain' means, that I can only believe that someone else is in pain that another person cannot have my pains that when I say 'I am in pain' I am at any rate justified before myself.

Wittgenstein intended to show that such a private language does not exist that it is a logical impossibility. If sensation-words are not connected with overt manifestation of sensations-i.e. if people just inwardly had pain but did not cry or groan or grimace or plead for help-then they cannot be used in any language. We learn

sensation-words in certain situations which give meaning to them. If a 'sign' is supposed to name a particular sensation independently of all its overt expressions and situations in which it is ascribed to persons then it cannot perform its job. It ceases to be a word in language.

Wittgenstein's main concern is to examine the thesis, that sensations can be named 'privately'. Before proceeding with his reduction ad absurdum argument, Wittgenstein imagined him interlocutor to put his case in this way. Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation.

To this end I associate with the sign 'S', and write this sign in a calender for everyday on which I have the sensation. According to Wittgenstein a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. But still it is possible to give a kind of ostensive definition normally a sign is ostensively defined by pointing to the object or property it is intended to refer to. In all such cases the object or property is publicly observable. I can teach the meaning of 'red' to some one by pointing to something which is red. But I cannot point to the sensation in this sense. We cannot give ostensive definitions for sensation words in the ordinary sense. The only way open to the cartesian is to suggest that the connection is established by a private ostensive definition. Suppose I experience a certain

sensation, I concentrate inwardly on the sensation and give it the name "'S'". This is like an ostensive definition, only in this case I point to the sensation mentally and I give this definition to none but myself. I may keep a diary and write down the sign "'S'" whenever I experience the same sensation in future.

Wittgenstein replied that the whole idea of giving myself a private definition is pointless. In itself it is but an idle ritual, like my right hand's giving money to my left hand whether pointless or not, let us see if the idea is possible. Wittgenstein presented the following objections which show that it is not. Suppose I suddenly experience a sensation which I have never felt before. I focus my attention on it and decide to name it "S". The grammar of a name implies that I can use it correctly in future. In other words, to have named a sensation means that whenever the same sensation occurs to me, I shall be able to identify and name it. That is to say, if I have named a sensation "S", I shall be able to use "S" again, whenever I experience the same sensation. I have established a connection between "S" and a particular sensation, e.g., pain. But I have not established this connection if in future I apply the sign "S" to some other sensations or to experiences other than sensations. e.g., emotions. Summarisingly my private ostensive definition is correct if, and only if, it enables

me to get the connection right every time. It must be possible for me to know whether the entires in my diary are correct or not. How is it to be decided whether I have used the sign "S" correctly or not?

I can know that I have used "S" correctly only if I can identify that I am experiencing the same sensation. In order to write "S" again in my diary, I must be able to recognise that it is the same sensation which I experienced before and named "S". But to speak of correctness is to imply the existence of a criterion of correctness. If there is no such criterion, it would be simply idle to talk of correctness. Wittgenstein is not assuming here anything uncritically, as might appear at first sight. It follows from the nature of language itself that there must be some way to distinguish correctness from incorrectness, if the former is to be used significantly or to be used at all. It would certainly be a dogma to accept a particular criterion as the criterion. But Wittgenstein never makes this claim. What he is saying is simply this that there must be some criterion. So what is the criterion of the sensation I have now and call "S" being the same as the one I experienced the other day and also named "S"? There is no external check. All I can say is that it seems to be so. But this is no criterion, because a criterion is required here to decide that what seems to be the case is really the case.

Undoubtedly, we often give such replies as "It seems to me to be so", "I think so" and "I believe so". But in all these cases there is some way of finding out whether what seems to be the case is really the case. In the present case, there is no such criterion which can help us if a doubt arises. I have only an impression that I have the same sensation. Consequently we cannot talk about correctness or rightness.

According to Wittgenstein in PI, sec. 258, whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about, 'right'.

To think that something is so, is not to identify it. My impression that I follow a rule does not prove that I follow the rule. There must be something independently of my impression that I can use to prove that I am following a rule. In this way the lack of any criterion of identity for the sensation makes a 'private' naming impossible. And the impossibility is of a logical kind. It is not that it is difficult to find out a criterion, there is actually no criterion. Therefore, there is no possible way on the Cartesian thesis to name sensations. A "private" diary would be a mere sham record - its signs being no sign at all. "S" for instance is an idle mark, it has no use, no function, no connection with anything.

One may be inclined to say that memory must be accepted as a criterion. One can simply remember a sensation

and by remembering it will know that one is making a correct use of its name. I can remember that the sensation I have now is the same which I had the other day. After all, we do have some confidence in memory, memory plays a vital role in our daily affairs. I remember that the train leaves at 10 a.m. and I rely on my memory. Similar is the case with sensations feelings etc. But Wittgenstein rejects this possibility. In a 'private' language, the assertion that my memory tells me so and so, will be empty. "My memory" does not mean even my memory impression. A memory impression is something which is either accurate or inaccurate. But in a "private language" there is no external check. I can, it might be said, appeal from one memory to another. But it is like buying several copies of the morning paper to assume oneself that what it said was true.

It is unfortunate that the importance of Wittgenstein's criticism of memory as a criterion of sensations has been missed. According to strawson Wittgenstein gives him self considerable trouble over the question of how a man would introduce a name for a sensation into this private language. But we need imagine no special ceremony. He might simply be struck by the recurrence of a certain sensation and get into the habit of making a certain mark in a different place everytime it occurred. The making of the marks would help to impress the occurrence on his

memory.

According to Strawson memory enables a man to use words to refer to his sensations and on the other hand Wellman says that if memory has no credibility, one can have no criterion for his use of any word. But Wittgenstein would never deny that memory plays an important role in our daily affairs and that it does act as a criterion. What they have failed to realize is that it is the infallibility of memory that is rejected by Wittgenstein not memory itself. Memory is something which may be true or false - it is not a court against which there is no appeal. Therefore, there must be something independent of memory to test its correctness. This point is ignored because usually we rely on our memory and act upon it. Example - I remember that the train leaves at 10.0 a.m. and I do not look up the time-table. But in case there is a doubt, I can look up the time-table. The important point is that in all such cases where we rely on memory, a criterion exists as to whether our memory is correct or incorrect. But in a "private" language no such criterion exists. What would show here that my memory is false or true? In the case of remembering a sensation no such criterion exists. And memory is not the highest court of appeal:

According to Wittgenstein⁵, imagine that you were supposed to paint a particular colour "C", which was the

colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined. Suppose that the colour struck you as brither on one day than on another, would you not sometimes say: "I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday?" This shows that we do not always, resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.

A Cartesian interlocutor may still insist that even if a man fails to identify his sensations, he does feel something and this is the important thing. Wittgenstein puts this point thus. "Yes, but there is some thing there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of that I utter it. And this something is what is important and frightful".

Wittgenstein rejects even this line of defence. He is not denying the presence of pain in the consciousness of the man who is in pain. What he is denying is the thesis that it is this "private" sensations - this something - that gives meaning to sensation-words. What he is maintaining is that "private" sensations do not enter into sensation-language games. Commenting on the alleged "something" Wittgenstein says:

"Suppose everyone had a box with something in it. We call it a 'beetle'. None can look into any one else's box and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking

at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box, might even be empty. No one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box. it cancels out, whatever it is".(PI,Sec.293).

If pain refers to "something" privately, then the "Something" cancels out. Pain, according to Wittgenstein, derives its meaning from the pain language-games; and what is important in pain language-games is pain behaviour, pain-comforting behaviour and other characteristics of the circumstances in which the word pain is used - not a 'private' sensation. It should not, however, lead us to suppose that sensations are nothing. Wittgenstein is aware of the charge of behaviourism and says that if he has denied anything, it is a grammatical fiction. The following remark sums up his position excellently:

"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing" - Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only

rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here".(PI, Sec.304).

Now, I am giving the point of Wittgenstein's positive account of sensation-expressions. It is a fact that we can and do talk about our sensation so the following questions must be answered: Does it make no sense to say that sensations are private? What is the function of sensation-expressions? How can I attribute sensations to others? etc.

According to Wittgenstein our use of sensation words is tried up with the expresssion of sensation. It may give the impression that Wittgenstein is advnacing a theory about sensations in opposition to the common sense view that they are private. But this impression is based on the misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy . He has explicitly rejected the impression that he has put forward a thesis. He destroys,only "houses of cards" and grammatical fictions. One of the reasons why people are led to the concept of a "private" language is this: sensations are private: none else can have my sensations (for instance, pains)". Wittgenstein examines the nature of this statement thoroughly and shows that it expresses only a grammatical point. The proposition "sensations are private" is compensable to "one plays patience by oneself". It is also like the proposition "every rod has a length" What

Wittgenstein means is that they are grammatical statements, inspite of their misleading similarity with empirical propositions and might be used to teach a learner how to use the words "sensation", "pain" or "rod" but could not be used for giving informations. The propositions "sensations are private" and "none else can have my pains" are not like the propositions "My head-aches are severe" and "noone else can look at my diary".

Now I am giving the following points about the logic of grammatical propositions which will enable us to understand Wittgenstein's ideas:

- (1) There is no sharp boundary between grammatical and empirical propositions.
2. Some propositions, therefore, may be used as either grammatical or empirical. For .example, the proposition, "pure water freezes at 0° centigrade" may either be used to teach someone what we mean by "0° centigrade" or to teach him a physical fact.

The proposition "None can have my pain" tells only the grammar of the word 'pain'. It cannot be used to support the metaphysical thesis that none can know anyone else's pains (or other sensations). To say that a proposition is grammatical is to say that it expresses some feature of the language. The proposition "sensations are private" tells us something about the use of 'sensations'. None else can

have my pains" expresses the grammar of the word 'pain'. This is to say, the language games in which the word 'pain' is used do not permit the use of the proposition. Two persons can have the same sensation". Consequently, the "privacy" of sensations is only a grammatical point and can not be used to support any metaphysical theory about them.

Here the second question arises if sensation-words do not name sensations privately, what uses do they have? How can they mean sensations at all? To appreciate Wittgenstein's replies to these questions, it would be better to start with his account of the first-person present tense uses of 'pain' (and other sensation-words) which are different from other uses. If I am in pain, it makes no sense to ask me "How do you know you are in pain"? but it makes a perfectly good sense to ask "How do you know that he is in pain". Similarly, I cannot say "I think I am in pain but I may be wrong", but it is quite correct to say, "I think he is in pain but I may be mistaken". In this way, questions and remarks which are odd in connection with the first-person present tense uses of 'pain' are quite significant for the third-person sensation-utterances.

What do the first-person present tense utterances of pain mean? What are the uses of sentences like? "I am in pain" and "I have a pain"? summarisingly, how do I learn to use sensation-words?

According to Wittgenstein how do words refer to sensations? - There does not seem to be any problem here, don't we talk about sensations every day and give them names? But how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? - of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. (PI, Sec. 244).

Here the actual thing is that Wittgenstein maintains that the meaning of 'pain' is established not by an ostensive definition but by actual situations in which pain is ascribed to persons and natural expressions of pain. Sensation-words are connected with the natural expressions of sensations.

Now, I should see how it is done. We teach children how to use sensation-words. For example, when a child falls down or receives an injury and starts crying or screaming, we comfort him with such words as "oh! you have a pain" and try to relieve the pain. Such things may occur again and the child learns that 'pain' is used in these situations; He may

first learn the exclamation pain! and later on sentences as "I am in pain" or "I have a pain". In this way "I am in pain" is not connected with my private sensations but with my pain behaviour which is publicly observable of 'pain' means a private sensation then the child can never learn its meaning. What is thus epistemologically important is pain behaviour, not a particular private sensation. Does it mean that 'pain' describes pain-behaviour, namely, crying, groaning etc.? Certainly not. When I want to cure my pain, it is not my behaviour that I want to end. Then, is the behaviour to be regarded as a symptom of the pain on the basis of which I say that I am in pain? clearly not. I do not verify that I am in pain by observing my behaviour. Sentences like "I am in pain" and "I have a pain" are not assertions about a sensation. To suppose that they are leads to absurdities. Nor are they descriptions of pain-behaviour. They are not assertions at all. They are very different language games.

According to Wittgenstein, the utterances "I have a pain" and "I am in pain" are not used as assertions either about a pain-sensation or about pain-behaviour. They are like groaning and grimacing. The utterance "I am in pain" is used like the words "ouch" and "ow". like "ouch", "I am in pain" is a learned expression of pain. My words for sensations are used in place of the behaviour that is the

natural expression of the sensations.

According to Wittgenstein in PI, Sec.244. So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying? On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

This explains the oddity of such remarks as "How do you know you are in pain",? "I think I am in pain" etc. These remarks are odd, for it makes no sense to speak of being mistaken about one's own groaning. Crying etc. - crying and groaning are not statements. Wittgenstein takes a step further and maintains that 'I' in the statement "I am in pain" does not name a person. In this way, neither 'I' nor 'pain' is a name of anything. The sentence expresses a new sophisticated pain-behaviour.

Now I am giving the third person sensation-expressions. Here the discussion may give the impression that all sorts of sensation words are expressions of sensations. This is wrong. Wittgenstein assimilates only first-person present-tense sensation words to expression of sensations. The logic of other sensation-words is different, they are not a part of acquired behaviour. To say, "He is in pain" is not to exhibit pain-behaviour. It is to say something about someone else in relation to which all the questions and remarks which are odd in relation to first-person present tense sensation-sentences, make

perfectly good sense. There is nothing absurd with these remarks: "I know he is in pain", "I believe he is in pain", "I guess he is in pain", "He might be in pain". "Judging from the way he is behaving I would say that he is in pain", "How do you know he is in pain?" "I think he is in pain" but I may be mistaken" and so on. That is to say, third-person sensation-sentences say something which can be true or false about which the speaker may be mistaken about which one can doubt and conjure and which is in need of some sort of verification. Does it mean that third-person sensation sentences describe a private mental object present in the consciousness of the other fellow? Certainly not. Nor do they describe his behaviour.

The first important point Wittgenstein makes in this connection is this. It is not false but unintelligible to ascribe sensations to inanimate things, to anything that is devoid of natural sensation expressions. "only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations". It is by analogy with the human behaviour that consciousness and sensations are ascribed to non-human beings. It means behaviour is essential for the ascription of sensation to others. If what is important is the occurrence of private sensations then it must make sense to attribute sensations to even inanimate things. It must make sense to imagine that pots, pans and

stones might be in great pain, the only difference is that they can not express their pains. How can I know that they are in pain? can one say of the stone that it has a soul and that is what has pain? One might as well ascribe it to a number! And our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead, is not the same. All our reactions are different. Where there is no possibility of pain behaviour, there is no possibility of pain either. This is why, it makes no sense to ascribe pain to pans, pots and stones. "And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it. But one feels inclined to object; at least in fairy tales the pot too can see and hear (and be in pain)." "Certainly, but it can also talk."

Now It is clear that in the view of Wittgenstein my criterion of another's being in pain is his behaviour. It does not mean that Wittgenstein is equating a person's being in pain with his actually exhibiting pain behaviour. First, a person can be in pain and suppress all pain behaviour. But notice that he does have to suppress it; in these cases, there must be at least a tendency, a proneness, to exhibit pain behaviour even if one manages to suppress the tendency." Secondly, a person can exhibit pain-behaviour without actually being in pain. He can be shamming, play-acting, giving a demonstration or he may be in the

hypotetic state. It means pain behaviour is a criterion of pain only in certain circumstances, in certain surroundings, not in others.

In this way, my criterion of the other person being in pain in his behaviour and his words and the circumstances. A person's behaviour is the criterion of his being in pain only if he is in a genuine pain situation. It is not Wittgenstein's aim to deny the fact that when a person is in pain he must feel pain, what he is emphasising is that an "inner process" requires "outward criteria". However, there is no list of circumstances that can enable us to know a priori whether the situation is genuine or not. But it should not lead us to despair and scepticism. There are situations of real life in which a question as to whether the person who is exhibiting pain-behaviour is really in pain, simply does not arise.

In this way, it is the context that determines whether a person is really in pain or is only shamming. In all such cases where the situation is genuine, our attitude towards the person in pain is different from the one who is shamming or play-acting. If I find the person is bleeding and groaning, I try to comfort him. If a Cartersian interlocutor still insists, on doubting, his doubt is unintelligible. It is true that it is always possible to imagine a doubt. My attitude towards the other person is an

attitude towards a soul. Similarly, the distinction between thinking that one person is in pain and thinking that another is not in pain is bound up with a difference in attitude. If I know that a person is in pain I react to him sympathetically and give him the advise to go for the doctor and take the medicine but if I know that he is not in pain I react differently. In this way, Wittgenstein would maintain that what is to be accepted as a justification or criterion is a form of life.

According to Wittgenstein in PI, p. 226, what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say-forms of life.

Here, some objections are given which are levelled against Wittgenstein's investigation of sensation-words. According to Strawson⁶ "a stronger and a weaker thesis, of which the first is false and the second true". The weaker thesis says that certain conditions must be satisfied for the existence of a common language in which sensations are ascribed to those who have them". "The stronger thesis says that no words name sensations (or 'private experiences) and in particular the word 'pain' does not, again he says"⁷ The oscillation between the two theses is to be explained by the fact that the weaker can be made to yield to the stronger by the addition of a certain premise about language viz. that all there is to be said about the descriptive meaning of a word is said when it is 'indicated what criteria people can

use for employing it for deciding whether or not it is correctly employed". His "obsession with the expression of pain" leads him "to deny that sensations can be recognised and bear names". Strawson attributes these errors to "the old verificationist horror of a claim that can not be checked" and to various confusions and muddles.

In the view of Malcolm⁸ this is an erroneous account of Wittgenstein. He never denies that we talk about sensations, describe them and give them names. Rather he says, it explicitly. "Don't we talk about sensations everyday and give them names?" and then asks, "How does a human being learn the names of sensations"? of the word 'pain' for example"? It is a fact that we classify sensation and give them names?" and give them separate names as 'pain', 'itch', 'ache' etc. We also distinguish sensations from feelings, moods etc. Certainly it is not Wittgenstein's aim to deny this. If sensations can not be distinguished, described and named then no talk about them is possible. The crux of the problem is how sensation words can mean sensations. A philosophical thesis was that sensation-words name sensations "privately" and what is important in naming a sensation is the sensation itself-its natural expression and its context being irrelevant. This thesis leads to another philosophical view that sensation-words have only one

function namely description. Wittgenstein is only denying these views about sensation-words. He maintains that it is impossible to name sensations 'privately' and that sensation-words have various uses in ordinary language. He would never deny that when a person is in pain, he must be experiencing something i.e. a particular sensation but he certainly denies that it is this something which is important, so far as the meaning of a sensation-word is concerned. The thought that behind some one's pain-behaviour is the pain itself does not enter into our use of "He is in pain" but what does enter into our use of it is his pain-behaviour, the situation in which pain is ascribed and our sympathetic or sympathetic reaction to him. In this way, he does not deny that there are inner experiences. Really, he speaks of "a pain's growing more and less" as an example of a mental process. According to Malcolm either to deny that such occurrences exist or to claim that they cannot be named, reported or described is entirely foreign to Wittgenstein's outlook. Wittgenstein discusses reports of dreams. According to Wittgenstein about the term 'description', think how many different kinds of thing are called "description": description of a body, description of a facial expression, description of a sensation of touch, of mood.

It means he is denying only a philosophical theory

about naming and describing sensations. We do not and cannot name or describe a sensation in the sense in which we name a tree or describe a room. There is a sense in which 'pain' is the name of a sensation. In this sense 'pain' stands for a sensation as '0' denotes a number, as 'red' denotes a colour. What we need to notice is the difference between the way 'red' and 'pain' function although both are names.

According to Wittgenstein in PI, Sec.38. We call very different things "names", the word 'name' is used to characterize many different kinds of use of a word, related to one another in many different ways.

To suppose that 'red' and 'pain' function alike is the sort of error that Wittgenstein is anxious to expose and rebut. Similarly, we can and do describe sensations but we can not do it either "privately" or in the manner we describe a room'.

Perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind" and "I describe my room". You need to call to mind the difference between the language games.

It is wrong to say that Wittgenstein has any "obsessions" with the expression of pain. Two things are important to note here. First, expressions are the "outward criteria" with which the sign must be connected if it is to be a sensation-word at all. Criteria are needed to use the

sign correctly not to identify my sensations. Secondly, it is only in the case of first-person present tense use of sensation-words that they are taken to be a part of pain-behaviour, other uses have various other functions.

Wittgenstein's main idea is to show how erroneous it is to suppose that sensation-words are only descriptive. Therefore, he says, "I am in pain" is not a descriptive sentence at all, its function is not to assert any thing. Rather, it is a new pain-behaviour. But Wittgenstein does not maintain that even this sentence (I am in pain) has one and only one use. It is only "one possibility". In other contexts it has other uses. As he says the words "I am in pain" may be a cry or complaint and may be something else. Depending on the context, it can be a request for help or even a pain-report. Summarisingly, there is no single use of 'pain', one must look at actual cases to understand its purpose.

Now, the point of Wittgenstein's use of criteria is given. In this conception Strawson finds "the old verificationist horror".

Ayer, Carl Wellman and Thomson have expressed the same view. What these critics have failed to realise is that Wittgenstein is not attaching the notion of "identifying" one's sensations in its ordinary sense. In this sense we can identify our sensations, feelings, images. Wittgenstein says

that there is no criterion for saying that two images of mine are the same, yet there is such a thing as recognition here and a correct use of 'same'. But there is a philosophical sense in which he does deny that we can identify or recognise our own sensations. "He attacks a philosophical use of the word only, the use that belongs to the notion of the private object". In this sense the identification is "corrigible" but it makes no sense to say: "Oh, I know what 'pain' means, what I don't know is whether this, that I have now is pain". If a person understands the word 'pain', he can not be in doubt as to whether he has the right experience (pain). The fact that there is no further process or need of identifying a particular sensation is, a reason why the talk of identification is irrelevant which should not be the case if what is important is the private object. Therefore, what is really significant for the use of sensation words is the outward criteria. Even when a man is said to identify his sensation (in the non-philosophical sense), he does not isolate it from the rest of his behaviour or the situation in which pain is ascribed.

In this way, in the concluding part I can say that in Wittgenstein's account of thinking (PI Secs. 116-394, 427, 501, 633-637, IIXi pp. 211, 216-223) and intending (PI, Secs. 611-660, ii, viii, xi, pp. 223-24) his general outlook is the same.

- (a) "What is happening now has significance - in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance".(PI,Sec.583).
- (b) "An inner process" stands in need of outward criteria.(PI,Sec. 580).

The foregoing arguments are designed to show that sensation words are not the names of inward experiences in anyway analogous to that in which "tree" or 'red' are the names of familiar kinds of object 'or property. These arguments are primarily negative. But sensation words, since they are words in our language must have some legitimate uses. If they donot have uses akin to words like "tree" and 'red' what uses do they have? let us turn now from Wittgenstein treatment of what these uses are not, to his account of what they are. Here, again, I shall follow Wittgenstein in using 'pain' as the primary example.

According to Wittgenstein in [BB,p.67] To say "I have pain" is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is.

This quotation reveals another interesting aspect of Wittgenstein's position. He not only denies that 'pain' in "I am in pain" denotes a private sensation, he also denies that the "I" in it denotes a particular person, namely oneself.

'When I say I am in pain' I do not point to a person

who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is". And this can be given a justification. For the main point is: I did not say that such and such a person was in pain but "I am" Now in saying this I do not name any person. Just as I do not name anyone when I groan with pain. Though someone else sees who is in pain from the groaning. [PI, Sect. 404].

These remarks, of course, do not apply to other-person pain utterances (e.g. "He is in pain"), to first-person non-present-tense utterances (e.g. "I was in pain") or to many other first person, present-tense utterances (e.g. "I have a scar on my hand" "I have a cat"). But we can not here delve into Wittgenstein's brilliant treatment of these matters.

As might be expected, Wittgenstein does not think that "I am in pain" has one and only one use namely, as a cry of pain, as a bit of sophisticated pain behaviour. In some contexts, it has that use but in other contexts, others.

We surely do not always say someone is complaining because he says he is in pain. So the words "I am in pain" may be a cry of complaint and may be something else. [PI, p. 189].

Consider the words: "I am afraid". In a frightening situation these words can be wrenched from one involuntarily, in which case they are very like a cry of

fear, a fear reaction. But they are not always like that. Depending on the circumstances, they can be a request for help or reassurance an angry self-reprimand, a report of one's dispositions in a certain area or even a report of one's present state of mind.

A cry is not a description. But there are transitions And the words "I am afraid" may approximate more or less to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it. (PI, p.189).

Wittgenstein is careful to warn us that these different uses are not always and are perhaps never entirely distinct or separate, on a given occasion, the words "I am afraid" may have two or more of these uses, although one may be predominant.

Are the words "I am afraid" description of a state of mind?. I say "I am afraid" someone else asks me". What was that? A cry of fear or do you want to tell me how you feel, or is it a reflection' on your present state? could I always give him a clear answer? could I never give him one?[PI, p.187].

Wittgenstein would say the same sort of thing about "I am in pain". Sometimes. those words too are wrenched from one in which case they amount to a cry of pain. Wittgenstein was perhaps more interested in this use than in the others

and emphasized it above them. but he would never deny the existence of the other uses. The words "I am in pain" may be a request for assistance or compassion or both or they may be used to hint that one desires the hearer to leave the room ("I am in pain, perhaps I'd better just rest quietly alone").

In other contexts, these words, but especially more specific pain reports, such as "I have a splitting headache" or "I have a pain in my lower abdomen" may be used to describe one's inner state.

If Wittgenstein would admit this last point as I think he would, does this mean that he must abandon his previous arguments and concede that 'pain' may be the name, in a strong sense of a private sensation? I think not. Wittgenstein points out that there are important differences among descriptions, depending on what they are descriptions of.

But is not the beginning the sensation which I describe? - perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind" and "I describe my room". You need to call to mind the differences between the language-games. [PI, Sect. 290]

In describing my room, one of the main things I do is to utter the names of various things in the room or of its parts and then ascribe to them certain of their more salient characteristics, so that my hearer will know what the room is

like - in particular, what it looks like. This is usually the whole point, the whole purpose, of a description of a room. But we must not think, Wittgenstein tells us that all descriptions have the same purpose - that is, we must not be misled by the grammatical similarity between - "He describes his room", 'He describes his state of mind, "and so on, into thinking that they all refer to the same post of activity. On the contrary:

What we call "descriptions" are instruments for particular uses. Think of a machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of a description as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it: one tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls: which seem simply to portray how a thing, look, what it is like.(PI, Sect.291).

The purpose of some descriptions-for example, those analogous to machine-drawings, is not to tell the hearer what the things look like but rather to instruct him accurately as to how the thing is to be built or repaired or whatever. And Wittgenstein would insist that when "I am in pain" is a description of one's inner state, it is most certainly not the purpose of this description to tell the hearer what the objects before the speakers consciousness fell like, what the nature of his private sensations are no

words can ever do that, as Wittgenstein has tried to show. Therefore, describing one's inner state unlike describing one's room does not involve naming certain objects and then attributing characteristics to them. Hence, Wittgenstein does not have to grant that 'pain' can be the name of a private sensation. What then is the purpose of descriptions containing the word 'pain'? There is no single answer to this question, one must simply look at actual cases and see what purposes they serve. Such a description might, for example, sometimes serve the purpose of indicating to the speaker's doctor what the source of the trouble is ("I have a burning pain in my throat, perhaps you'd better have a look at my tonsils"), or what remedy ought to be tried or whether the remedy already used is being successful or not. or it might give a person's reason for not being able to accept an invitation ("come along to the movies tonight", No I can't, I have a dreadful headache and don't feel like going out") and so on.

Now we must turn from the uses of 'I am in pain' to those of sentences like 'He is in pain' and they are in pain. One thing atleast is certain to say: "He is in pain" is not to cry out in pain. It is to say something about someone else, something which can be true or false, about which we may be mistaken, about which we can conjecture and doubt and so on. But what? It need hardly be stated at this

late stage that according to Wittgenstein to say "He is in pain is certainly not to say that a private mental object denoted by the word pain is before the other fellow's consciousness. Is it, then, to describe his behaviour, to assert that he is exhibiting some kind of pain behaviour? The short answer to this question is "No" but some explanatory discussion is in order.

Here, According to Wittgenstein the first point to be made in this, certain modes of behaviour are essential to the concept of pain in the sense that the notion of pain is applicable only to things that behave in these ways. This is connected with the fact discussed earlier that the use of the word pain is learnt and can only be learnt in situations characterized by pain behaviour (or by some reference to pain behaviour, at least). It is not merely false to ascribe pain to things that can not behave so - it is unintelligible, it makes no sense, to do so. He suggests:

"Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations - one says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well as ascribe it to a number! And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it. (PI, Sect. 284).

Only of what behaves like a human being can one say

that it has pains. (PI, Sec.283).

This view differs markedly from that according to which 'pain' is the same of a private sensation as 'tree' is the name of a publicly observable object: on that view, the only thing essential to the concept of pain is a certain sensation or feeling and all so called pain behaviour is a mere consequence, a mere contingent accompaniment, of that sensation. If this view were right, then it ought to be easy to conceive that inanimate objects, like pots, pans and stoves, might be in great pain but simply happen not to express or manifest it in their behaviour. But there is some thing absurd in this idea, we really can not conceive of pots and pans are said to see and hear and feel pain and be angry, but then they also talk and move in various ways. Where there is no possibility of pain behaviour there is no possibility of pain either. Of course the words "the stove is in pain" may lead us to have one or more images, just as the words "It is 5 O'clock on the sun" may do. But in neither case can the picture be applied. Hence in neither case can one understand what is being said. (PI, sect. 351). The picture can not be applied, for nothing follows from it, one can not do anything with it. One would not, for example, dream of comforting the stone. Indeed, what would it be to comfort a stove?

"But can't I imagine myself having pains and turning

to stone while they continue? And would not this be an example of a stone's having pains?" (PI, Sect.283). Suppose we allow the intelligibility of this suggestion. Even so, it does not describe a situation in which a stone has a pain. Once the behaviour is cut away, by my turning to stone, the pain, as it were, floats free of me. In place of a person in pain these are now two things - a free disembodied pain with the block of stone, so that one could say the stone has the pain? As Wittgenstein says, "what has.....pain to do with a stone?" (PI, Sect.283). The conclusion is that pain behaviour is an essential part of the concept of pain. And this is surely right; for if a person does not wince or grimace or cryout, or atleast have an inclination, desire' or tendency to do one or more of these things, then he is not, cannot be, in pain.

It does not follow from this, however, that we can simply equate a person's being in pain and suppress all pain behaviour for a time, perhaps even for quite a long time. (See PI, Sect. 281). But notice that he does have to suppress it, in these cases, there must be at least a tendency, a proneness, to exhibit pain behaviour, even if one manages to suppress the tendency. Conversely, a person can exhibit pain-behaviour without being in pain, he can be shamming, play-acting, giving a demonstration and so on.

Moreover, one can easily imagine automata behaving in all the ways humans behave when they are in pain, and yet we would not suppose that the automata were in pain. So, more is involved in another persons' being in pain than his simply exhibiting pain behaviour. But what more? The natural temptation is to reply". In addition to behaving in a certain way, he must also be feeling pain". This is clearly the right answer: the idea of pain doubtless enters into these language-games, But the important question is: how does this idea enter in?" Well, I see that he is groaning and "clutching his side and I hear him say 'My side hurts'. However, if I am to look upon this as a genuine pain situation, rather than a bit of play-acting, for example, I must also believe that the fellow feels pain". Again, Wittgenstein would agree, but he would want to know what it is to believe that the other fellow is feeling a pain. Does it involve having the image or picture of a private sensation, just like one's own pain, having before the other fellow's consciousness? Wittgenstein has already argued against this suggestion. The representation of pain enters into the language game, he will admit, only not as an image or picture. (PI, Sect.300).

According to G. Pitcher, The representation of pain enters in not by any reference to a mental object behind the pain behaviour and causing it, but rather by a reference to

the circumstances including the various sorts of surroundings, of the present pain behaviour. To believe that the person who is now pain-behaving really is in pain is to view the situation as being of a certain kind, as having for example, a certain "before and after" as fitting into a certain kind of wider situation. If I thought that the present pain behaviour were part of one kind of situation (for example, if I thought that it resulted from a desire to fool the onlookers), I would not regard it so as manifestation of real pain; but if I thought it were part of another kind of situation (for example, if I thought it resulted from a knife wound or an internal disorder) then I would regard it as a manifestation of real pain.

Believing that another person is in pain also has another aspect to it, this aspect is what Wittgenstein called the attitude of the believer. Consider the differences between a situation in which we are dealing with what we take to be an automation exhibiting pain behaviour and one in which are dealing with a human being exhibiting the same behaviour, in the latter case but not the former, we believe that the other feels pain. Malcolm reports that in lectures, Wittgenstein discussed an imaginary tribe of people who had the idea that their slaves were all automata, soul-less machines with human bodies. Some of the masters' dealings with these slaves would be the same as those

between a master and a human slave, for example, the master would let a slave rest when it complained of being tired, would feed it when it was hungry and would try to heal it if it complained of being sick, although I imagine the master would speak not of healing it but of repairing it and not of its being hungry but of its needing food or being low on food. We do not speak of our auto mobiles as being hungry when they need fuel but then of course they do not have human bodies, either'. On the other hand, some of, the masters' dealings with these mechanical slaves would be radically different from a master's dealings with a human slave.

They would look at the slaves in a peculiar way. They would observe and comment on their movements as if they were machines. (Notice how smoothly his limbs move'). They would discard them when they were worn and useless, like machines. If a slave received a mortal injury and twisted and screamed in agony, no master would avert his gaze in horror or prevent his children from observing the scene, any more than he would if the ceiling fell on a printing press.

We do not treat human beings first just like a machine. This is the main difference between a machine and a person because we do not look at a person in the way we look at a machine, and a machine does not look back at us. We comfort people in pain

and seek to cheer them up, it is unthinkable that we should do this to a machine. And so on. Summarisingly I can say that our attitude towards automata, towards machines in general is radically different from our attitude towards people.

In Philosophical Investigations Sect. 420.....just try to keep hold of this idea that the people around one are automata, lack consciousness, in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say! say to yourself, for example: "The children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism". And you will either find these words becoming quite meaningless or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling or something of the sort.

Doesn't a presupposition imply a doubt? And doubt may be entirely lacking. Doubting has an end. (PI, P.180).

However, there can be unusual circumstances in which such a doubt is perfectly possible: if a person's look and actions are sufficiently peculiar, Pitcher may begin to wonder if he is not perhaps an automation. But suppose I resolve the doubt in favour of his being a person, so that I now believe he has a soul. What happens when I acquire this belief? I look at him and act towards him as I do toward conscious beings: I adopt that attitude and to have the belief is to have the attitude. It may seem as through my

attitude toward him is one thing and my belief that he has a soul another thing, a thing which accounts for the first but this is not the case. To be sure, all sorts of pictures may be connected with the words "This man has a soul" - for example, a picture of spiritual sphere inside his head or hovering just above it or perhaps of an ethereal substance spread throughout his body. But if we seek to determine how this picture might be applied in order to see what the belief that has a soul actually amounts to, we find nothing but the way I look at him, talk to him, act toward him. Summarisingly, nothing but my attitude toward him.

"My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul".(PI, p.178).

To believe he has a soul is just to look at him in the way I do, to act toward him in the way I do, for example: Comforting him in sorrow, laughing with him at jokes, discussing people and events with him) to react to him in the way I do - in short, to have the attitude towards him that I do. There is nothing else for the belief to consist in, save for the idle accompanying images, if any and they do not matter.

In philosophical Investigation sect. 287. Pity, one may say, is a form of conviction that someone else is in pain." But I still can not help thinking that when I believe another person is in pain, I believe that he is experiencing

something, a private sensation very much like my own pains and that this is why I pity him comfort him and so on". Wittgenstein is unimpressed by claims that one can not help thinking or paying such and such.

Being unable - when we surrender ourselves to philosophical thought to help saying such and such, being irresistibly inclined to say it - does not mean being forced into an assumption or having an immediate perception or knowledge of a state of affairs. (PI, Sect.299).

What is important is not the mere words but what they mean. Of course, one cannot help thinking that (a) the other fellow over there, groaning and holding his side is feeling something, feeling pain; but this does not mean that you are forced to assume that (b) he is experiencing a private sensation just like yours. Wittgenstein has argued at length that such an assumption is senseless. The picture we have may seduce us into supposing that when we think (a) we are ipso facto thinking (b). This picture, like so many others, lies in our language in certain modes of expression. Well, then, imagine that we dispense with the words.

In Philosophical Investigations, sect. 310). I tell someone I am in pain. His attitude to me will then be that of belief, disbelief, suspicion; and so on.

Let us assume he says: "It's not so bad" - Doesnot that prove that he believes in something behind the outward

expression of pain? - this attitude is a proof of his attitude. Imagine not merely the words "I am in pain" but also the answer "Its not so bad" replaced by instinctive noises and gestures. (PI, Sect.310).

When the words are replaced by groans and comforting gestures which do the same job as the words, we may not be so tempted to think that the original hearer was concerned about some private mental content that lies behind the other fellow's pain behaviour.

But must not there be some explanation of why we treat people, and specifically people in pain, differently from the way we treat automata and those we believe to be malingering or shamming? And what could this explanation possibly be but our beliefs that people have souls, that people in pain feel something frightful, while automata have no souls and people who are shamming pain do not feel anything frightful?" But as Wittgenstein has tried to show, these alleged "explanations" are futile, for they reduce either to absurdity or to, emptiness. If the belief that other people in pain "feel something frightful" is interpreted to mean that they have a frightful private sensation called 'pain' before their consciousness, the suggestion is absurd and if it is interpreted in a legitimate manner, the explanation then reduces to the empty tautology that we treat people in a certain way because we

treat them in that way. Thus, Wittgenstein would say that one must not look for explanations here but must simply note a form of life.

What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life. (PI, p.226).

We just do treat people differently from automata and people we believe to be in pain differently from people we believe to be shamming. This is the way we do things, this is our form of life. It is not the only possible one. We might conceivably treat other people and animals as the masters in Wittgenstein's example treat their mechanical slaves. Some of Descartes' followers thought animals were automata and actually put them into hot ovens; they noted with interest and in the best scientific manner how those complicated mechanisms operated under those conditions - emitting ear-splitting banks and cries, clawing violently at the oven door, and so on. That is a possible form of life but it is not one of ours, nor is it possible to appeal to private sensations to explain our forms of life, to explain the language-games we play with words like 'pain'. Private sensations play no part in these language games and could not possibly explain them. We must, in fact, resist the temptation to explain our language-games at all.

According to Wittgenstein in PI, Sect. 654 our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look

at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.

The question is not one of explaining a language game by means of our experiences but of noting a language-game (PI, sect.655).

Here, G. Pitcher has been concentrating on 'He is in pain' as it is used to state something about a person but as with 'I am in pain' Wittgenstein would assert that this sentence can have many different uses, depending on the circumstances. The notion that 'pain' is the name, in a nontrivial sense, of a private sensation proves to be a decided hindrance in our attempt to see what the numerous uses of the word 'pain' actually are.

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1. PII, 243
2. cf. BB 60, PII, 272.
3. PII, 293
4. PI, Sec. 84.
5. PI, Sec. 56.
6. Strawson, P.F., Critical Notice: "Philosophical Investigations", Mind, Vol. 63, 1954.
7. Ibid, p. 84.
8. Malcolm, N., "Philosophical Investigations", PR, Vol. 63, 1954.

CHAPTER - VI

CONCLUSION

The two works of Wittgenstein: Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations - projected mark differences in the style and content. The common opinion formed from the two was that they did not carry forward similar and connected doctrines. With the publication of his later works of the thirties this view was found very simple. It was revealed that both had such connections and assumptions which were common to his earlier and later works. There are three principles on which rests the common contrast derived from the 'Tractatus' and 'Investigations'.

They are as follows:

1. Wittgenstein says in 'Tractatus' about metaphysical atomism, that is, that the names are the ultimate elements of language which denote simple objects. Elementary propositions are concatenations of these names, and each such proposition is independent of every other such proposition. It has been propounded in the 'Investigations' that the words 'simple' and 'complex' have no absolute meaning and the search for the ultimate independent elementary propositions is regarded as a false opinion.
2. In the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein shows his interest in the formal structures of symbolic Logic as a key to the ideal essence of the proposition and of language whereas in

the 'Investigations', he devotes to the study of the idioms of ordinary language and has discarded the view that 'language has an essence.'

3. 'Tractatus' speaks that sentences had meaning or sense because they were pictures whereas 'Investigations' says that the meaning of a sentence is its use or employment or application. The view, that 'a significant sentence is a picture', is replaced in the later thought by the concept that the sense of a sentence is determined by the circumstances in which it is spoken, and the language-game to which it belongs.

Out of these three aforesaid contrasts the first one seems to be correct. The second one is partly correct and partly misleading. The third one is almost wholly misleading. Both the works insist that the sentences of the ordinary language are in perfect order as they stand (T.L.P. 5.5563; PI I, 98). Both works insist that a language is a part of human natural history (T.L.P. 4.002; PI I 25). Both remarks, that the ordinary language is a deceptive clothing and that what it conceals, are the differences between expressions which look similar (T.L.P. 4.002; PI II, 224). In both, the differences hidden by the similar appearance of written and spoken words, are revealed by a consideration of their use of application (T.L.P. 3.143, 3.262; PII, II).

However, in each of the above parallels, there is the

difference of emphasis. Since the sentences of ordinary language are in order, the 'Tractatus' holds that appearances, not withstanding, they have a perfectly definite sense, whereas, the 'Investigations' concludes that definiteness of sense is not required for logical order (PII, 99-100). In talking of human nature the 'Tractatus' stresses the complication of language, whereas, the 'Investigations' its common placeness. The hidden differences under the clothing of language are differences between names, descriptions and propositions in 'Tractatus' (T.L.P. 3.143; 3.261), whereas, in the 'Investigations' specially different types of names, (PI 1, 383), different types of descriptions (PI 1, 290), different types of verbs and propositions (PI 339, 693; 2123, 472).

After all, Wittgenstein had reflected in detail in the 'Investigations' but he had not done so in the 'Tractatus' about that involved in the use or application of a word. The use of a word is its relation to the primitive sign and through them to the simple which they denote - according to 'Tractatus', whereas, in the 'Investigations' the use of a word is its parts in a Language - Game, in a form of life (CF. T.L.P. 2.0271; PI II, 226).

Wittgenstein in his criticism of 'Tractatus Philosophy of Logic' - throws open the misunderstanding of the role of ideal in language for criticism (PI I, 89-137). The 'Frege

and Russel Logic' was thought something, which was already present in the proposition in 'Tractatus' instead of not an object of comparison with which our language might be contrasted. Since they were obviously not present in the proposition on the page, they must be present in the proposition in the thought, strange intermediary between science and fact, hidden and deemed perceived in the medium of the understanding (PI I,94, 102), a non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm (PI I,108). The 'Investigation' treats it a mistake to look for something common to all propositions, and looking for it just mentally is a double mistake. Actually, proposition like game as stated in PI I,108, is a family-likeness term and all the members of the family are spatial and temporal phenomena with physical properties. The search for the essence of language is still on, but the essence is not a mysterious something beneath the surface to be brought to light by analysis; but 'something that already lie open to view and becomes surveyable by a rearrangement (ibid):

In the beginning of the thirties Wittgenstein realised that the notions of naming, comparing etc. belong to the study of the nature of symbolism and thus led to philosophy. In the 'Tractatus', the notion of reading is briefly introduced as an unexamined comparison for the pictorial nature of the proposition (T.L.P., 4.011), whereas,

the 'Investigations' has a minute examination of the concept (PI I, 156 ff). These observations and related concepts enabled Wittgenstein to believe that the datum, on which language rests, the framework into which it fits, is given by a shifting pattern of forms of life visible in common human nature, and not by a structure of unchanging atoms, (PB, 72).

Thus, it is clear that even after the abandonment of the metaphysic of logical atomism, the picture theory is maintained. Wittgenstein him self says: "The essential thing in a proposition is that.....it is a picture. (WWK-90). The theory of language-games enabled him to ammend his theory instead of abandonment. It is clear from the above that instead of treating it false, the picture theory requires additions. Thus, the theory of meaning as use is a compliment rather than contrary to the picture theory. It has been asserted that use of signs is necessary to enliven the signs which seem to be dead.

Wittgestein has made efforts to project his view confidently that mental content can not be designated by mental words, because meaning of a word is not established by it's occurrence even in the situations where mental content seems to be present. The use of words and sentences in a language and life give meaning and life to them.

Like the 'Tractatus' dominated by the comparision between proposition and picture, the 'Investigations'

reiterated the view that we play games in the language. The concept of language-games was more than a metaphor like the picture theory of meaning. Wittgenstein asserted that the words can not be understood outside the structure of non-linguistic human activities into which the use of language is interconnected: the words and their behavioral surroundings make the language - game. Words are like tools and their functions differ from one another. But by their uniform appearance in sound and print, their dissimilarities of functions are hidden. For understanding the meaning of a word, the study of the language-game to which it belongs is required as to how does it contribute to the activities of a group of language-users. Generally, the meaning of a word is not an object for which it stands, but rather it's use in language (P.l.l, 11-12, 24, 43).

The study of language-games shows that all the words are not names and giving names is not so simple as it appears. The asking and giving of names can be done only in the context of language-game. The 'Investigations' is mostly related to discussion of the nature of language like the 'Tractatus', but following the later developments the 'Investigations' deals in detail the relation of language to thoughts and states of mind. Thus, the 'Investigations' is a classic not only to philosophy of language, but also of philosophy of mind. In the 'Tractatus' the ultimate data

are the atoms which form the substance of the world, whereas, in the 'Investigations' those are the forms of life in which the language games are interwoven.

But the argument relating to the interest of private-language is not 'merely internal to Wittgenstein's own philosophy. According to him a private language is a language whose words refer to what can only be known to the person speaking to his immediate private 'sensations' (P II,243). Dualists and behaviourists have different views about the philosophy of mind. Dualists claim that human mind is independent of the body and it can be separated from it. They hold that connections between is not necessary. Behaviourists hold that reports of mental acts and states are disguised reports of pieces of bodily behaviour, at the most the tendencies may behave bodily in definite ways. Wittgenstein rejected both these said views. He agreed to the Dualists to this extent only that particular mental events could occur without accompanying bodily behaviour. He agreed with the behaviourists that the possibility of describing mental events depends on their having an expression in behaviour. According to him to attribute a mental event or state to someone is not to attribute any kind of bodily behaviour; but such attribution can be made sensibly to beings which may have appropriate behaviour. The 'Philosophical Investigations' contains fully the

painstaking discoveries of psychological concepts like sensation, thought, understanding.

Thus, we find that inspite of the differences between the 'Tractatus' and the 'Investigations' there is continuity in Wittgensteins' philosophical conceptions. For him philosophy is an activity than a theory because the activity clarifies propositions and prevents us from being misguided by the misleading appearances of ordinary language. But the method of clarifying propositions is not to analyse them to disclose their hidden structure, but to show the method of their application in language-games. Wittgenstein still holds in the 'Tractatus' that the metaphysician has given no meaning to certain signs, whereas, in the 'Investigations' he says that 'signs' have no part to play in language-games. He still discards the possibility of philosophical theses and says that the aim of philosophy is to safeguard us from propagating meaningless things and from being mentally disturbed by problems which have no solution. Philosophy achieves clarity by the disappearance of it's problems, and not by the solution of philosophical problems. Wittgenstein himself expresses his view about the complications of philosophy:

"Philosophy writes the knots in our thinking, which we have foolishly put there', but to do that it must make movements which are just as complicated as those knots.

Although the result of philosophy is simple, it's method can not be if it is to arrive at that result.

The complexity of philosophy is not in it's subject matter, but in our knotted understanding" (PB.52; translated by Norman Malcolm, The Philosophical Review', Vol.LXXVI,P.29).

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